Alessandro Achillini (1443-1512) and His Doctrine of 'Universals' and 'Transcendentals': A Study in Renaissance Ockhamism (review)

108 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY should read "Book 15.") Further along, instead of having Ockham say "these names do not signify exactly the same thing" (ista nomina non omnino eadem significant), Loux makes him declare that "these names do not, in all contexts, signify the same things" (p. 62). For Ockham, meaning or signification is a property of a term taken in itself, whereas supposition is a property of a term in the context of a particular proposition. Thus "man" and "humanity ," the names he is here talking about, might supposit for different things in different contexts , but independent of the context they always signify or mean different things. Finally, a few observations are in order regarding the text used by Loux. He provides no translation of the last 15 lines of chapter I l (a text found in the Boehner and new critical edition ). A few other mistakes come from his use of the Boehner text, which, although very good, has a few faulty readings and small omissions. It is to Loux's credit that he himself caught some of Boehner's editing mistakes. For example, he knew that throughout chapter 66 Boehner's actus significatus should be actus signatus and that in chapter 77 Boehner's metaphorica should read metonymica; and he adjusted his translation accordingly. He did not, however, catch certain omissions in chapter 66 (and a few elsewhere): instead of Boehner's "Praeterea, haec est vera: 'Color est primum objectum visus'; et quaelibet singularis est falsa, igitur habet suppositionem simplicem; sed si supponeret pro intentione animae, ilia esset falsa; igitur suppositio simplex non est pro intentione animae," the more complete reading is "Praeterea, haec est vera 'color est primum obiectum visus'; sed si 'obiectum' habet suppositionem personalem, quaelibet singularis est falsa; igitur habet suppositionem simplicem. Sed si supponeret pro intentione animae, ilia esset falsa, quia nulla intentio animae est primum ohiectum visus, quia nulla intentio videtur; igitur suppositio simplex non est pro intentione animae." Nor did Loux catch other small mistakes: for example, inclusiva (p. 214) should be exclusiva and should thus read "This is clear in the case of the expression of exclusion in an affirmative proposition." In sum, then, I would judge the work to be very high on a readability scale and as a great aid to those who want a first approach or general appreciation of this part of Ockham's logic. At times, however, it is not totally accurate; and thus, for close historical detail and logical precision , it must many times be checked against the new critical edition. STEPHEN F. BROWN University of the South Alessandro Achillini (1443-1512) and His Doctrine of 'Universals' and "Transcendentals': A Study in Renaissance Ockhamism. By Herbert Stanley Matsen. (Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1974. Pp. 332. $27.50) This fine monograph makes accessible for the first time in English the thought of the Renaissance philosopher, and professor at the University of Bologna, Alessandro Achillini. Matsen not ony has provided an account of certain major principles of Achillini's metaphysics , based on the original Renaissance published editions, but he has also, for the first, biographical chapter, done research in the manuscript archives. This firsthand account is thus based solidly on the primary sources. Although Achillini is not a profoundly original thinker, his philosophy is of great historical interest in that it represents the vigorous survival of various medieval philosophical tendencies , particularly Ockhamism, all through the Renaissance. Matsen emphasizes Achillini's Ockhamism, although he admits that Achillini is not an orthodox follower of that English thinker. In fact, it seems that Achillini follows Ockham chiefly when he wishes to refute the more "realistic" metaphysics of John Duns Scotus (see pp. 172, 177). Like Ockham, Achillini sees only a grammatical or a mental distinction in many cases where Scotus sees some extramental one (p. 151). Yet Matsen often fails to show any real dependence of Achillini on Ockham (pp. 149-150); and Achillini's view of truth, for example, seems not particularly "Ockhamist" (p. 145). BOOK REVIEWS 109 This learned and useful book does, however, contain various errors of philosophic interpretation, some of them quite serious. Matsen's curious view that Ockham is...