Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, a Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 283 borgian theory of the collective redemption of the "Grand Man" or human society. (See Krolikowski's informative chapter on "The Peircean Vir," pp. 257-270.) Charles Hartshorne thinks this theological negligence is "Peirce's most serious mistake" (chap. 26). Peirce should have attributed firstness to the Abselutel I am inclined to believe that Peirce might have retorted that this is a serious mistake on Hartshorne's part. If Peirce had been given the choice of calling God firstness or thirdness, I suppose he would have preferred thirdness, on the right hand of the Summum Bonum. But he is remarkably clever in treating creation, redemption, and "evolutionary love" as natural processes. It is true that he rejected the mechanistic naturalism that was rampant about him, but I believe he would also have rejected what Goudge calls his "transcendentalism." His secular medieval realism was for him a positive achievement of which he was proud when faced by the idealists and theists who were hounding him on all sides. On the other hand, he certainly was not a militant anti-clerical , and there is little anti-religious comment in his publications or papers. He was able to accept the divine relativity calmly. A third trait that looms large (and seems to be looming larger, according to Goudge, pp. 331 ft.) is his treatment of mind as something objective, "an external phenomenon," a principle of existential orientation. Ite insisted "that we are in thought, not that thoughts are in us." Man is distinctive among animals because he behaves culturally, that is, invents and exploits symbols, whereas other animals are restricted to learning by signs only. This emphasis on objective thirdness Goudge calls Peirce's "transcendentalism." But it seems to me that Peirce was intent on locating mind observationally and organically as a feature of life and of the real world, and that he used the concept of "the phaneron" for the precise purpose of explaining that in his phenomenology logical structure can be observed as a natural fact. This interest shows itself in a striking way in Peirce's early preoccupation with "existential graphs" for logical relations (see chap. 6 by Don Davis Roberts) and in his use of this method in projecting elementary textbooks in mathematics (see chap. 3 by Carolyn Eisele). But it shows itself as well in his most abstract mathematical researches, for he seems to be resisting consciously the current search for the "foundations" or principia in mathematics, and to exhibit mathematical structure and method as an exploration of the visible world. His emphasis is on method rather than on "elements," on existential structures rather than on "pure form." The reader is tempted to imagine him seeking logical rock bottom, but Peirce never hits bottom, nor does he worry about "depth." He merely finds new evidence for his big three cxistcntials. Note as examples: the three aspects of method arc observation, experimentation , and habituation (pp. 73-74); the three types of signs (index, token, and icon) are related respectively to denotation, description, and implication (pp. 97-98); so are alpha, beta, gamma in the existential graphs (p. 109) ; in types of evolutionary theory chance, mechanism , and evolutionary love indicate emphasis respectively on firstness, secondness, and thirdness (p. 326). Darwin's conception of natural selection is superior to the "mechanical" models of Spencer and Chauncey Wright because it provides "orientation" (p. 326). Mill's psychology of mechanical association is inferior to Bain's emphasis on habit (p. 330). The categorial triads keep appearing in one context after another. But this celebration of triadic analysis, ontology, and cosmogony is quite different from the "kind of "basic ontology" that Heidegger seeks, or from the search for principia mathematica. In general, Peirce's habits of speculation and experiment are still fresh and unconventional, excellent philosophical stimulation, entertainment, and wonder. HERBERTW. SCHNEIDER Claremont, Cali]ornia Kant's Theory o] Mental Activity, a Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic o] the Critique o] Pure Reason. By Robert Paul Wolff. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. xii + 336.) It is one of the ironies of English ~holarship that a work like the present one should have been so long in coming. The student who...