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58 3 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS Even if a shift of strategy away from sticks and toward carrots were considered by anyone wishing to alter the behavior of another state, there is no a priori guarantee that this would advance the nation’s aims more successfully than punitive measures, and we need to grasp the circumstances that increase or decrease the outlook for effective engagement. This, in turn, requires an analytic framework within which to organize the empirical inquiry—a framework of concepts and propositions that helps identify the questions to be asked and from which hypotheses, to be confronted with the evidence of case studies, might be drawn. Given a better understanding of the conditions for the successful use of inducements , and relying on our knowledge of the junctures at which resistance to their use may be overcome, we improve considerably our appreciation of the role they can and cannot play in international relations. The starting point is a closer look at two purposes that positive incentives could serve. Both rely on similar instruments and can be pursued in tandem, but they are, in terms of their ultimate aims and mechanisms, logically distinct. The first possible intent is to offer an adversary some concession intended to produce a desired counterconcession. The purpose is to effectuate a trade resulting in the target’s altered conduct, and inducements offered in this spirit play out in the context of what I will call the exchange model. The analytic task is to determine what objectives can most plausibly be attained in this fashion and what conditions are most conducive to success.The second aim is more ambitious: to change the other side’s basic incentives, such that bribes and punishments ultimately become unnecessary. The purpose here is not to promote a trade but to catalyze A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 59 a thorough overhaul of relations. Inducements offered with this purpose occur in the context of what I will term the catalytic model. Much of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the logic behind the conceptions of positive incentives associated with these two models and to the conditions for success or failure in both. Each begins with a critical juncture that makes new policies possible. Elements of the Exchange Model: Incentives as Trading Carrots Here, the usual purpose is a specific quid pro quo: an exchange of finite and more-or-less balanced concessions to the mutual benefit of both sides, wherein, from each side’s subjective perspective, the benefits of the exchange outweigh the costs of the reciprocating gesture. Nothing beyond the particular quid pro quo is expected. Reciprocal concessions can be made within the same issue area, or moves in one area may be rewarded by gestures in another. Bilateral reductions of strategic arsenals during the U.S.-Soviet SALT process illustrate the former; European offers of economic assistance to Iran to induce it to abandon programs capable of yielding nuclear weapons exemplifies the latter. In neither case was it expected that the other side would fundamentally alter its goals and priorities beyond what was implied by the particular quid pro quo: a finite objective (e.g., a reduction in Soviet ICBMs,an Iranian commitment to abandon uranium enrichment ) is sought in such contexts, with no necessary broader expectations.1 Moreambitious,butstillwithinthetermsof theexchangemodel,maybenotthe exchange of discrete favors and inducements but repeated concessions intended to convey one’s own benevolent nature with the goal of altering the overall character of the other side’s behavior and requiring no immediate reciprocation.2 The same effect could be produced by a single, unilateral grand gesture that impresses the adversary by its sincerity and goodwill. While this strategy is situated somewhere between the exchange and catalytic models, its logic lies closer to the former, since it involves no basic change in the other side’s political character, merely in its perception of one’s own side, and since reciprocation is merely deferred. There is very little in the historical record to guide our understanding of the promises and pitfalls of this latter strategy. A modest body of experimental research suggests that repeated conciliatory moves, though not assuring 1. Even here, a catalytic transformation generally would be welcomed; it’s just that it usually is not expected. 2. Deborah Welch Larson has argued that repeated unilateral gestures may be needed on one side to launch a process of bilateral cooperation (1987, 56–57). 60 THE LOGIC OF POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT a favorable result, may...

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Additional Information

ISBN
9780801463013
Related ISBN
9780801450068
MARC Record
OCLC
774285567
Pages
224
Launched on MUSE
2014-01-01
Language
English
Open Access
No
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