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141 6 Fürsorge: Acknowledging the Other Dasein As we saw in chapter 5, the encounter with the originary temporality of other Dasein is acknowledged in the very fact that there are public standards to which one submits oneself. The existence of foreign nows to which I must accommodate my own originary temporality is a necessary condition for the bindingness and publicity of the norms and shared structures of meaning that characterize what Heidegger means by world. It is for this reason that worldly structures and objects speak to me of the presence of others, a point that allows Heidegger to overcome the difficulty that faced Sartre regarding how the world is experienced as shared even in the absence of concrete others. One experiences a type of Dasein-presence through worldly things—in the cultivated field, for example—and the encounter is experienced as personal insofar as particular dimensions of these worldly things are salient. Thus one does not recognize the presence of other Dasein simply through this or that expanse of dirt, but in the trace of her purposive activity; in the fact that this expanse of dirt is cultivated and thereby succeeds in meeting particular standards of purpose: “These others do not stand in the referential context of the environing world, but are encountered in that with which they have to do, in the ‘with which’ of their preoccupation as the ones who are preoccupied with it. They are encountered as they are in their being-in-the-world, not as chance occurrences but as the ones who till the field” (HCT 240). Other Dasein and the traces of their work are not encountered as “chance occurrences” but as practical agents expressing their attuned, projective being-in-the-world through purposive worldly roles and activities.1 Others are not simply part of the referential context of meaning delimited by one’s projects—another “part” of the world. Rather, they are encountered “as they are in their being-in-the-world” (HCT 240): thrown into the world and committed to projects that center meaningful contexts of reference. These equipmental contexts, these roles and activities, are manifestations or expressions of the care that makes them meaningfulas publicly significant equipment or action. Without others who exist in this heedfulness to one another and the public 142 T I M E A N D T H E S H A R E D W O R L D measures evoked by such heedfulness, the world qua context of significance would not be possible as such. This being-there-too with them [the others] does not have the ontological character of being objectively present “with” them within a world. The “with” is of the character of Da-sein, the “also” means the sameness of being as circumspect, heedful being-in-the-world. “With” and “also” are to be understood existentially, not categorically. On the basis of this like-with being-in-the-world, the world is always already the one that I share with the others. The world of Da-sein is a withworld . (BT 118/111–12) On the basis of this like-with the world is one I share with the others, not vice versa. Though the order of priority is clear—the world as public, normatively binding context of significance depends on the intersubjective encounter with particular others—we have nevertheless not yet shown that the encounter with every other Dasein involves a being-toward the other qua originary temporality. The worldly space of shared significance demands that some others be recognized as such—it requires an “open intersubjectivity”—but in order to completely refute Sartre’s critique, we must show that every other is encountered as such at least on some minimal level. Specific Intersubjectivity and Solicitude Fürsorge is Heidegger’s answer to this requirement. Generally translated as “solicitude” or “concern,” Fürsorge is meant to designate a mode of care specific to encountering other Dasein. Thus Heidegger insists that Fürsorge is not the same as taking care of things—“although this kind of being is a being toward beings encountered in the world, as is taking care of things” (BT 121/114). Ecstatic transcendence or “being toward” characterizes both taking care of things and solicitude for others, but the fact that in the latter case it is another Dasein to whom I am related marks an insuperable difference: “The being to which Da-sein is related as being-with does not, however, have the kind...


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