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454 Document No. 82: Notebook Entries of Lt. Gen. Viktor Anoshkin December 11, 1981 The following notebook excerpt is one of the more important pieces of evidence to emerge in recent years concerning Jaruzelski’s desire for Soviet military assistance in connection with martial law.16 Lt. Gen. Viktor Anoshkin was adjutant to Marshal Kulikov during the crisis and accompanied him as a note-taker on his frequent visits to Poland, including on December 11, two days before martial law. The crucial page reproduced below recounts, according to Anoshkin, a conversation between Kulikov and Jaruzelski that day. (The notes reflect Kulikov’s recitation of the conversation to his adjutant.) Here, the Polish leader is depicted as trying, apparently somewhat excitedly, to establish whether Soviet military aid will be forthcoming. By Anoshkin’s account, after Jaruzelski learns, via Soviet Ambassador Boris Aristov, that the Kremlin ’s reply is no, he blurts out: “This is terrible news for us!! For a year-and-a-half people have been rambling on about the introduction of troops—and now that’s all vanished. Where does this put Jaruzelski?!” The most apparent implication from this entry is that Jaruzelski, despite his intensive efforts in recent years to claim that he wanted above all to prevent a Soviet intervention, was in fact counting on Moscow to send help—albeit most likely in the belief that an internal crackdown would fail. 16:35 I just came from Cde. Aristov who in a very confidential way informed me of the following: 1. Per instructions — called — Jaruzelski Milewski and raised the following issues: (1)  We are asking someone from the party leadership to come here. Who will that be and when? (2)  Make a statement in our support. Aristov is convinced that a request was sent to the Center. (3)  Can we count on assistance along military lines from the USSR (concerning add’l introduction of troops)? (4)  What meas[ures] for rend’ing econ. assistance to Poland [are planned] on the part of the USSR? Aristov ↓ Rusakov: ↓ Rusakov’s answers:17 16  Anoshkin accompanied Kulikov to the international conference, “Poland 1980–1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions,” held at Jachranka, Poland, on June 26–28, 1997. He agreed in advance of the conference to bring his notebook to share with researchers , although only a few pages were ultimately photocopied. For additional selected pages and interpretation, see Mark Kramer, “The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 11 (Winter 1998), pp. 17–28. 455 1. – No one will come; 2. – Measures will be taken; 3. – We will not introduce troops; 4. – Baibakov is preparing an answer; [The following lines are written vertically up left-hand margin of page:] This is terrible news for us!! For a year-and-a-half people have been rambling on about the introduction of troops — and now that’s all vanished [otpalo]. Where does this put Jaruzelski?! [Source: Notebook of Lt. Gen. Anoshkin, originally photocopied at the 1997 Jachranka conference (see footnote above). Previously published in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 11 (Winter 1998), p. 19. On file at the National Security Archive, “Soviet Flashpoints” collection. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.] 17  The leftward and downward arrows are approximately as in the original, signifying that Aristov’s information, i.e. the four points which follow, came from Rusakov. ...

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Additional Information

ISBN
9786155211157
Related ISBN
9789637326844
MARC Record
OCLC
191932687
Pages
602
Launched on MUSE
2014-01-01
Language
English
Open Access
No
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