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400 Document No. 73: Extract from Protocol No. 37 of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting November 21, 1981 Jaruzelski’s election as party first secretary in October naturally gave rise to hopes in the Warsaw Pact that changes would finally occur in Poland. But once again the Kremlin came to the conclusion that the Polish leadership had no major measures under consideration. The following message to Jaruzelski, occasioned by his request for a meeting in Moscow, contains a list of Soviet concerns and more urgings for prompt action. The reasons for the Kremlin’s unease are familiar, but are sharpened here and there by developments such as Jaruzelski’s recent meeting with Archbishop Glemp and Lech Wałęsa, which Brezhnev conditionally approved but which raised further questions of political control. Despite the Soviets’ rekindled disappointment, Brezhnev adopts a tone that is far more courteous than in his previous conversations with Kania. Here he ends with the very formal invocation: “Esteemed Wojciech Władysławowicz!” On the reception of the PPR party-state delegation in the USSR and the oral communication of Cde. L. I. Brezhnev to Cde. W. Jaruzelski. 1. Confirm the text of the oral communication of Cde. L. I. Brezhnev, which he instructed the Soviet ambassador to convey to Cde. W. Jaruzelski (attached). 2. Acknowledge the expedience of receiving a PPR party-state delegation in the USSR, headed by Cde. W. Jaruzelski, on December 14–15, 1981. Confirm the composition of a Soviet delegation at talks with the PPR delegation : Cdes. L. I. Brezhnev (head of the delegation), M. A. Suslov, Yu. V. Andropov , A. A. Gromyko, N. A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. Yu. Chernenko, K. V. Rusakov. 3. For the CPSU CC Department, the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, KGB of the USSR, and Gosplan of the USSR, prepare the necessary materials for negotiations with the Polish party-state delegation, including a draft communication for the press. For the CPSU CC Department and the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, introduce proposals for organizational measures related to the reception of the Polish delegation to the USSR. * * * Regarding Point 21, Prot. No. 37 Secret 401 Warsaw The Soviet Ambassador Visit Cde. W. Jaruzelski and, referring to instructions, convey to him the following oral communication of Cde. L. I. Brezhnev: Esteemed Comrade Jaruzelski! We have examined attentively your proposal to visit Moscow as the head of a party-state delegation which would also include the leaders of allied PUWP parties , and we are in agreement with it. As for the dates, the visit could take place on December 14–15 if, of course, that is convenient for you. At the same time, insofar as there is still time before the meeting, I decided to convey to you via Cde. [Boris] Aristov my impressions on urgent questions regarding the situation in Poland, which remain the subject of our serious unease. I am not revealing secrets by saying that your selection as first secretary of the PUWP CC was met here with great hopes. We took into account that earlier in the struggle with anti-socialist forces you, as chairman of the Council of Ministers , apparently were constrained by the lack of political decisiveness on the part of the party leadership. Now this impediment has disappeared. The Fourth PUWP CC Plenum made a direct connection between the change in first secretaries and the need for urgent measures for the salvation of socialism in Poland. When I congratulated you over the telephone, I was pleased to hear that the trust you sense from our side played a definite role in your agreement to accept this responsible post as leader of the PUWP under such critical circumstances. I said this to my comrades and our hopes intensified that in you we would find someone of like mind and an ally in one of the most acute areas of the struggle with imperialism, which Poland has become. You recall that in that telephone conversation I expressed the hope that there will be a feeling both in Poland and abroad that events in the country are proceeding differently. We then spoke about decisive preconditions for a turnabout in circumstances, and you agreed that you must select reliable assistants for yourself from among the numbers of committed and staunch communists, and set in motion the entire party, having instilled in it the spirit of struggle, and without wasting time launch aggressive actions against the counter-revolution. Obviously, the core question now is the question of the struggle...

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