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267 Document No. 45: Extract from Protocol No. 7 of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting April 23, 1981 Moscow’s inability to hammer out a solution on Poland continues to be evident in this Politburo discussion. One week after Brezhnev called for a more strategic, or long-term, approach, the Commission on Poland apparently finally came up with a set of proposals that are the subject of this session. The analysis of Poland’s internal situation shows several things. The Kremlin understood that Solidarity was not a monolithic institution and that Wałęsa was a relative moderate among its leadership. Their fear at this stage was that extremists would take over the movement and force matters to a head. In a similar way, they worried that pro-Solidarity members of the PUWP might try to take power from within by getting their allies promoted to leadership posts. There is some talk in this document about more hard-line leaders who could replace Kania and Jaruzelski but those individuals are acknowledged to be in the minority and their approach to ending the crisis is too blunt for the Soviets. Several proposed measures win approval at this session. The most interesting one is to “exploit to the maximum” Polish fears of a Soviet invasion. The possibility that the Kremlin deliberately exaggerated the threat helps to explain why various Polish officials, including Jaruzelski and CIA informant Ryszard Kukliński, believed that such a move was likely, if not inevitable. […] On the Development of Conditions in Poland and Certain Steps from Our Side. 1. To agree to the considerations contained in the note by the CPSU CC Politburo Commission on the Polish question (attached). 2. To confirm the plan of measures for providing aid to the PUWP leadership for the organizational and ideological strengthening of the party (attached). * * * On Point VII, Prot. No. 7 […] On the Development of Conditions in Poland and Certain Steps from Our Side. The internal political crisis in Poland has become protracted and chronic. To a significant degree, the PUWP has lost control of the processes under way in society . At the same time, Solidarity has transformed itself into an organized political force, which is capable of paralyzing the activity of party and state organs and 268 virtually taking power into its own hands. If the opposition is not yet ready for that, then more than anything it is due to their concern over the possible introduction of Soviet troops and hopes of achieving their goals without bloodshed and by means of a creeping counter-revolution. At the Sejm session on April 10, the Polish leadership did not risk raising the matter of decisive actions against the anti-socialist forces. It evidently cannot and in essence does not wish to depart from the line adopted for overcoming the crisis by political means. It is true that in Cde. Jaruzelski’s report to the Sejm there was a series of proposals in the spirit of recommendations, which our side has continuously articulated to the Polish comrades. However, they were not laid out in a way that would be binding but in the form of appeals or aspirations. The compromise nature of the report is explained above all by the fact that it was adopted calmly and did not provoke the confrontation our friends had feared. Surveying the results of the Sejm, as its first success—albeit a minor one— Cde. Kania and his associates are now becoming somewhat more active in their endeavors to shore up the authority of the party. They have made speeches at a variety of major industrial enterprises, and they held a meeting with worker and peasant members of the PUWP CC. The regular CC plenary session is set for April 25. Documents are being prepared for the PUWP Ninth Congress, which must be held before July 20 of this year. Certain measures are being taken within the government with the goal of somehow restoring order to the economy. At the same time, it is evident to all that the lull after the session of the Sejm was short-lived. The adversary has approached it for tactical reasons, while continuing to build up his forces to deliver new blows against the party. Solidarity as a whole and its separate parts are preparing for the next round of blackmail of the authorities by raising various primarily political demands. Signs of stratification that have appeared among the leadership of this trade union have not yet provided grounds for counting on...

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Additional Information

ISBN
9786155211157
Related ISBN
9789637326844
MARC Record
OCLC
191932687
Pages
602
Launched on MUSE
2014-01-01
Language
English
Open Access
No
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