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201 action: based on practical reasoning , 15; explanation of, 178; intentional, 15, 24, 25, 178, 180; justification of contrasted with explanation of, 18 action plan, 33, 38–40, 44, 46, 49, 88, 112, 113, 140, 158 Addams, Jane, 42, 53, 54, 58, 136, 181, 182; a semi-fictional example, 47–48; as an example of pragmatist practical reasoning , 33–35, 37, 39–41, 43, 45, 46; fixed-end interpretation of, 36; on charity, 170–72 agent-relative morality, 16 Anscombe, G.E.M., 17 Aristotle, 19–20, 103, 185; on perception of the particular, 80 Arras, John D, 120 Baier, Annette, 187 Bohman, James, 191–92 Bourdieu, Pierre, 180 Bradley, F. H, 189 Campbell, James, 161–62 Card, Claudia, 187 casuistry, 104–6; as radical particularism, 103 character: as interpenetrating habits, 60; narrative structure of, 60 complexity, 22 conscience: craft contrasted with moral, 136; Dewey on, 87 consequentialism, 16 Cooper, Neil, 187 Couzens-Hoy, David, 163, 192 Dancy, Jonathon, 96–98, 103, 109; criticism of, 101; on radical particularism, 96–99, 101; on residual effects of moral principles, 99 Darwin, Charles, 145, 146, 173–74 Davidson, Donald, 179; on conceptual schemes, 191 decision problem, 111, 113, 115, 131, 137, 144; relation to ideological distortions, 114 deliberation: see deliberative event deliberative event, 40, 42, 44–46, 49–50, 77, 86, 88, 89, 96, 104, 112–14, 150, 158, 163, 170, 175; Index 202 Making Morality deliberative event, continued a model of, 37, 119, 169; and interpretation, 38; and structure of practical justification, 38; as mediator of habits, 38; relationship to warrantestablishing arguments, 119 determination problem, 112, 113, 115, 118, 131, 135, 137, 143, 146, 158, 170; relation to ideological distortions, 114 Dewey, John, 1, 11, 13, 27, 28, 30, 45, 52, 57, 70, 110, 147, 177, 180, 183, 184, 191, 192; on ends-in-view, 79; on ends-inview as action plans, 46; on means-end continuum, 42–43; on moral nonconformity, 145; on praise and blame, 136–37; on right/obligation claims, 140, 141; on selective emphasis, 3–4; on the authority of moral standards, 139; on the denial of final ends, 41; on the distinction between rules and principles, 112; on the epistemic argument for democracy, 159; on the generalized sense of duty, 143– 44, 188; on the origins of moral theory, 4–5; on the pattern of inquiry, 182; on the public, 156–60, 174; on the unique quality of good, 80–81; on three independent factors in morals, 139; view of duty contrasted with Kantian, 188 Dreyfus, Hubert I., 179–80 Dreyfus, Stuart E., 179–80 Dworkin, Ronald, 188 Eldridge, Michael, 177 expert, 155, 159 fixed-end view, 14, 17, 19–20; as distortion of value deliberation, 79–80; as notionally the same as pragmatism, 41; of intentional action, 16; of justification, 16; of practical knowledge, 30; of will, 56; the truth in, 50–51 Flanagan, Owen J., 186 Foucault, Michel, 163, 168, 193 Frankena, W.K., 187 genealogy, 163–65; and deliberative events, 170; and moral skepticism, 166–69 good (s), 62, 67; and appreciation, 72; and conflict, 83–84; and valuation, 70; as a non-natural property, 66; connection to norm-governed judgments, 82– 83; external, 77–79; fixed-end view of, 77; functionally defined as predicate in action plans, 67– 68; functionally defined as summary of activities, 68; internal, 71, 72, 74, 77, 78–79; objectivity of, 73; specification of, 80; see also value Green, Judith, 191 Green, Thomas: on Will’s view of norms, 95 Habermas, Jurgen, 184; on democratic deliberation, 191 habits, 6; and implications on responsibility, 59; and impulsive energy, 53; and transactions, 28; Index 203 as historical transmissions, 30– 31, 46; as norms, 51, 61; as transactions, 31; interpenetration of, 25, 27, 28, 31, 48–49, 53; propulsive quality of, 57–59; relation to character, 52; relation to will, 52, 56–57; see also norms Haggerty, Dan, 192 Hare, R.M., 104, 105 Hegel, G.W.F., 133, 177 Hegelian, 177–78 Hickman, Larry, 191 holism, 26 Hull House, 33, 35, 40, 41, 43, 53, 136 Hume, David, 19–20, 184; on sympathy, 137 impartiality: pragmatist view of, 132 imperative: categorical, 90, 93 interpretation, 111 intuition, 182 Johnson, Mark, 180 Jonsen, Albert, 102–6, 108, 115, 120 judgment, 88; neo-Kantian view of, 90 justification (practical): analogy with scientific reasoning, 48–50; as distinct from deliberation, 32–33; hedonist view of, 44; structure of according to fixedend view, 31–32, 42; structure of according to pragmatism, 41– 42, 44, 45...

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