Chapter 7 Tribal Sovereign Immunityand the Indian Civil Rights Act
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57 Tribal Sovereign Immunity and the Indian Civil Rights Act 57 P.288, n.8. Add the following to line 6 of the footnote after the semi-colon: NLRB v. Fortune Bay Resort Casino, 688 F. Supp. 2d 858, 871 (D. Minn. 2010) (rejecting sovereign immunity claim with respect to subpoena issued by the National Labor Relations Board’s General Counsel because “the underlying proceeding” was a “prosecution” in which the General Counsel was “responsible for enforcing the public interest, not for enforcing the rights of private litigants”); Replace “, with” in line 9 of the footnote with a period. Replace “but see” in the second-to-last line of the footnote with a period and the following: A contrary conclusion, however, was reached in Gristede’s Foods, Inc. v. Unkechuage Nation, 660 F. Supp. 2d 442 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), where the district court held that federal recognition was not a prerequisite and that common lawbased tribal status sufficed. Id. at 465 (“[p]ursuant to federal law, a group of Indians is a tribe—and therefore enjoys sovereign immunity—if it either 1) has been federally recognized by Congress or the BIA, or 2) meets the federal common law definition”); cf. Add the following to the end of the footnote: A tribe’s immunity from suit also has been held inapplicable to in rem actions that may affect its property interests. E.g., Smale v. Noretep, 208 P.3d 1180, 1181 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (applying Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d 379 (Wash. 1996), and holding that tribal immunity from suit did not preclude an in rem action to quiet title under an adverse possession claim without regard to whether land was within or without the tribe’s reservation). Chapter 7 Tribal Sovereign Immunity and the Indian Civil Rights Act 58 2011 Supplement—American Indian Law Deskbook, Fourth Edition P.294, n.50. Add the following to line 1 of the footnote after “see also”: Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 605 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2010); vacated, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (tribe possessed immunity from property foreclosure action based upon tax delinquencies; outcome was not controlled by City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), which upheld involved counties’ right to impose taxes, because “[w]hile the tax exemption of reservation land arises from a tribe’s exercise of sovereignty over such land, and is therefore closely tied to the question of whether the specific parcel at issue is ‘Indian reservation land,’ . . . a tribe’s immunity from suit is independent of its lands”); Add the following to line 4 of the footnote after the semi-colon: Ameriloan v. Superior Ct., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (noting state agency’s contention that Manufacturing Technologies “is inapposite because it involved a private action, not a government-initiated enforcement action,” and responding that the agency “misapprehends the relevant case law and confuses principles of preemption with those governing tribal sovereign immunity”); Add the following to the end of the footnote before the period: ; see generally Nathaniel T. Haskins, Note, Framing Current Jurisdiction Issues in the Self-Determination Era: Accepting the First Circuit’s Analysis but Rejecting Its Application to Preserve Tribal Sovereignty, 32 Am. Indian L. Rev. 441, 458 (2007–2008) (characterizing the Narragansett majority opinion’s analysis as “a work of fiction” to the extent it reasoned “that tribal sovereign immunity was an incident of its sovereignty, and therefore, when the tribe subjugated its autonomy by consenting to concurrent jurisdiction, it did the same to its sovereign immunity”) P.295, n.51. Add the following to line 2 of the footnote after “E.g.,”: Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (concluding that Ex parte Young relief is available against tribal officers, but remanding for a determination of “whether ‘in equity and good conscience’ the suit can proceed with the [tribe’s] officers but without the [tribe] itself”); Add the following to line 26 of the footnote after the semi-colon: Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 472, 482 (N.D. Okla. 2009) (dismissing action under Rule 19 as to damages claim related to poultry operation’s allegedly adverse impact on watershed for failure to join tribe as party, and reasoning in part that “[b]ecause the State’s claims involve allegations of 59 Tribal Sovereign Immunity and the Indian Civil Rights Act harm...


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