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 Federal Indian Law Policy: Origins and Legal Development Chapter 1 Federal Indian Law Policy: Origins and Legal Development  P.2, n.9. Add the following to line 1 of the footnote after “See generally”: Michael D. Oeser, Tribal Citizen Participation in State and National Politics: Welcome Wagon or Trojan Horse?, 36 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 793, 825–26 (2010) (“[A] person with tribal ancestry is not necessarily politically ‘Indian.’ Such a person is genetically Indian, might be culturally ‘Indian,’ and might even be entitled to tribal citizenship, but until enrollment, he or she forms no part of the tribal body politic. A person merely ancestrally or culturally ‘Indian’ who lives off-reservation deserves all the civil rights protections state and federal citizenship afford, including protection from racial discrimination in voting. On the other hand, individuals that are politically ‘Indian’—i.e. enrolled tribal ‘members’—are citizens of another sovereign”); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 933, 980 (2009) (examining 163 “preliminary memoranda” prepared by Supreme Court law clerks concerning certiorari petitions during the 1986–1993 period, and concluding that “[t]he modern certiorari process, with its dependence on law clerks applying the Court’s Rule 10, virtually guarantees that the cert pool will denigrate petitions filed by tribal interests” because “[t]ribal petitions, often involving the interpretation of Indian treaties or complicated and narrow common law questions of federal Indian law, are readily deemed ‘factbound’ and ‘splitless[]’” and because “the cert pool values and perhaps better understands the interests of state and state agency petitions”); P.4, n.14. Add the following to the beginning of the footnote: Tonya Kowalski, The Forgotten Sovereigns, 36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 765, 771–72 (2009) (“At the heart of today’s tribal-federal relations is the colonial doctrine of discovery. . . . Whether one agrees about the extent to which the cognitive model of the Conqueror is embedded within key Supreme Court cases like Johnson v. M’Intosh, there can be no doubt that the central method of classifying Native American people as ‘subhuman’ and ‘heathens’ dominated large portions of U.S. law and policy during the assimilation era”);  2011 Supplement—American Indian Law Deskbook, Fourth Edition P.5, n.23. Add the following to line 3 of the footnote after “e.g.,”: Nicholas A. Fromherz & Joseph W. Mead, Equal Standing with States: Tribal Sovereignty and Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 29 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 130, 155, 159 (2010) (observing that “[m]any of the fundamental principles underlying Indian law were framed by Chief Justice John Marshall” in the trilogy, and arguing that “Worcester recognized that states have no power to regulate Indian tribes, essentially placing them at an equal mark on the sovereignty scale” and that, “[i]n placing tribes and states on a more or less equal footing in terms of sovereignty, Worcester supports the claim that tribes should be entitled to the same ‘special solicitude’ as states” for standing purposes in environmental law-related controversies); P.7, n.29. Add the following to the end of the footnote: but see Fife v. Moore, No. CIV-11-133-RAW, 2011 WL 1533147, at *3 (E.D. Okla. 2011) (enjoining tribal prosecution because “crimes committed by Native Americans outside the territorial boundaries of Indian country are subject to state [not tribal] prosecution[,]” and “the definition of Indian country is provided by federal statute, not the tribe.”). P.11, n.51. Add the following to the end of the footnote before the period: , rev’d, 559 F.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2090 (2010) P.14, n.71. Delete that portion of the footnote from “On remand ” in line 8 through the period at the end of line 21. P.14. Add the following to the text after footnote 71: The Supreme Court applied the same analytical approach in reversing the Federal Circuit’s determination following remand proceedings in the Navajo litigation that a combination of federal statutes, other than the IMLA, created a money-mandating trust obligation.71.1 71.1 United States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 1547 (2009). On remand, the tribe had been permitted to pursue another breach of trust theory premised on a “network” of treaties, statutes and regulations other than those before the Supreme Court. Its theory was rejected by the Federal Claims court but accepted by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Navajo...


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