restricted access Appendix II. Notes and drafts for the lecture course of Winter Semester 1933–1934
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Appen di x II Notes and drafts for the lecture course of Winter Semester 1933–1934 1. Thomas: veritas; intellectus (Quaestiones de veritate, quaest. I, art. 1–12)1 . . . ubi invenitur perfecta ratio veritatis [where we find the complete account of truth] (cf. quaest. I, art. 2). . . . per posterius invenitur verum in rebus, per prius autem in intellectu [the true is found secondarily in things, but primarily in the intellect] (cf. ibid.). Relation to Aristotle, Metaphysics E 4! And: in intellectu divino (creans) mensurante, non mensurato [in the divine (creating) intellect that is measuring, not measured]. Pre-formation; intellectus humanus speculativus [the human theoretical intellect] is imitative; intellectus humanus practicus [the human practical intellect] is preformative or constructive in a certain way. Why {primarily in the intellect}? Because veritas = adaequatio [truth = conformity] and Veri enim ratio consistit in adaequatione rei et intellectus [for the definition of the true consists in the conformity of thing and intellect] (art. 3); {verum} aequalitas diversorum est [(the true) is an equality of diverse things] (ibid.), “equality” (as-similation). So there is veritas where intellectus (vel enuntiatio, quae intellectum significat [or articulation, which indicates intellect], art. 5c) begins to 1. {Sancti Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici ordinis praedicatorum Opera Omnia: Tomus IX: Quaestiones disputatae, Volumen secundum, completens De veritate et Quaestiones quodlibeticas (Parmae: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1859).} [Modern edition: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1970– 1976), vol. 22, pp. 1–3. English translation: Thomas Aquinas, Truth, vol. I, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S. J. (Chicago: Regnery, 1952; repr. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994). The translation here is ours. In this section of Heidegger’s text, which uses Latin extensively , italics are used only for emphasis and not to indicate foreign words.] 214 have something of its own that the res [thing] does not have—but this content proper to the intellect is correspondens [corresponding]! Intellectus dividens et componens [the intellect separates and combines], so necessarily [it involves] reflectio supra se (reditus) [reflection on itself (return)] (art. 9). Intellectus . . . adaequatur rebus, quarum cognitionem habet [the intellect is conformed to the things of which it has knowledge] (art. 8c). What does this mean? Here deduced formally from the idea of adaequatio [conformity] (cf. art. 5c: commensuratio, verum = commensuratum ; “aequalitas,” convenientia [having a common measure, the true = the commensurate; “equality,” agreement]), without a phenomenal look at the inner presuppositions that lie in ἀ-λήθεια; cf. Being and Time. Intellectus . . . formans quidditates, non habet nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam, sicut et sensus inquantum accipit speciem rei sensibilis [the intellect forming essences has only a likeness of the thing existing outside the soul, like a sense inasmuch as a sense grasps the form of a sensible thing] (art. 3). * * * Whatness has only selfsameness, thus no diversitas [diversity]—here no possibility of adaequatio, veritas [conformity, truth]. Everything based on “difference,” “equality,” “similarity,” as though it were a matter of a relationship between things. But why is the intellectus formans quidditates [intellect forming essences, or whatnesses] nevertheless posterius—verum [secondarily true]? (definitio, i. e. per ordinem ad compositionem [definition, i.e., from order to composition]). Cf. art. 3c, end: everything based on adaequari [to be conformed]! Intellectus (intus legere) proprie = apprehensio quidditatem—and thus non est falsitas in intellectu. [Intellect ([etymologically] to collect within) properly = apprehension of whatness—and thus there is no falsehood in the intellect.] Quidditas: proprie objectum intellectus. [Whatness: properly the object of intellect.] (Cf. art. 2.) Intellectus “in cognoscendo quod quid est”—semper verum? [Intellect “in knowing that which is”—always true?] What does this mean? Cf. above, art. 3. How do the two go together? Adaequatio simply taken as present at hand: it is given, i.e., it is an ens creatum [created being]. With this, a seeming objectivity of all beings in which I was merely operating. In this, man only a functionary, a hireling. 2. {The dominant conception of truth as correctness} The dominant conception of the essence of truth: correctness—fact of measurement. For the lecture of Winter Semester 1933–1934 [285–286] 215 Agreement between proposition and thing. From early on and in different worlds: Kant, Thomas, Aristotle. Despite his {Kant’s} definition of cognition , that cognition does not direct itself to objects, but objects to cognition . A proposition that has nothing to do with subjectivism. The common interpretation of Kant. This conception {agreement of proposition and thing} has a peculiar prominence and obstinacy. To decide about it—hopeless! To look at it more closely: 1. so...