In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Appen di x II Notes and drafts for the lecture course of Winter Semester 1933–1934 1. Thomas: veritas; intellectus (Quaestiones de veritate, quaest. I, art. 1–12)1 . . . ubi invenitur perfecta ratio veritatis [where we find the complete account of truth] (cf. quaest. I, art. 2). . . . per posterius invenitur verum in rebus, per prius autem in intellectu [the true is found secondarily in things, but primarily in the intellect] (cf. ibid.). Relation to Aristotle, Metaphysics E 4! And: in intellectu divino (creans) mensurante, non mensurato [in the divine (creating) intellect that is measuring, not measured]. Pre-formation; intellectus humanus speculativus [the human theoretical intellect] is imitative; intellectus humanus practicus [the human practical intellect] is preformative or constructive in a certain way. Why {primarily in the intellect}? Because veritas = adaequatio [truth = conformity] and Veri enim ratio consistit in adaequatione rei et intellectus [for the definition of the true consists in the conformity of thing and intellect] (art. 3); {verum} aequalitas diversorum est [(the true) is an equality of diverse things] (ibid.), “equality” (as-similation). So there is veritas where intellectus (vel enuntiatio, quae intellectum significat [or articulation, which indicates intellect], art. 5c) begins to 1. {Sancti Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici ordinis praedicatorum Opera Omnia: Tomus IX: Quaestiones disputatae, Volumen secundum, completens De veritate et Quaestiones quodlibeticas (Parmae: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1859).} [Modern edition: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1970– 1976), vol. 22, pp. 1–3. English translation: Thomas Aquinas, Truth, vol. I, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S. J. (Chicago: Regnery, 1952; repr. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994). The translation here is ours. In this section of Heidegger’s text, which uses Latin extensively , italics are used only for emphasis and not to indicate foreign words.] 214 have something of its own that the res [thing] does not have—but this content proper to the intellect is correspondens [corresponding]! Intellectus dividens et componens [the intellect separates and combines], so necessarily [it involves] reflectio supra se (reditus) [reflection on itself (return)] (art. 9). Intellectus . . . adaequatur rebus, quarum cognitionem habet [the intellect is conformed to the things of which it has knowledge] (art. 8c). What does this mean? Here deduced formally from the idea of adaequatio [conformity] (cf. art. 5c: commensuratio, verum = commensuratum ; “aequalitas,” convenientia [having a common measure, the true = the commensurate; “equality,” agreement]), without a phenomenal look at the inner presuppositions that lie in ἀ-λήθεια; cf. Being and Time. Intellectus . . . formans quidditates, non habet nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam, sicut et sensus inquantum accipit speciem rei sensibilis [the intellect forming essences has only a likeness of the thing existing outside the soul, like a sense inasmuch as a sense grasps the form of a sensible thing] (art. 3). * * * Whatness has only selfsameness, thus no diversitas [diversity]—here no possibility of adaequatio, veritas [conformity, truth]. Everything based on “difference,” “equality,” “similarity,” as though it were a matter of a relationship between things. But why is the intellectus formans quidditates [intellect forming essences, or whatnesses] nevertheless posterius—verum [secondarily true]? (definitio, i. e. per ordinem ad compositionem [definition, i.e., from order to composition]). Cf. art. 3c, end: everything based on adaequari [to be conformed]! Intellectus (intus legere) proprie = apprehensio quidditatem—and thus non est falsitas in intellectu. [Intellect ([etymologically] to collect within) properly = apprehension of whatness—and thus there is no falsehood in the intellect.] Quidditas: proprie objectum intellectus. [Whatness: properly the object of intellect.] (Cf. art. 2.) Intellectus “in cognoscendo quod quid est”—semper verum? [Intellect “in knowing that which is”—always true?] What does this mean? Cf. above, art. 3. How do the two go together? Adaequatio simply taken as present at hand: it is given, i.e., it is an ens creatum [created being]. With this, a seeming objectivity of all beings in which I was merely operating. In this, man only a functionary, a hireling. 2. {The dominant conception of truth as correctness} The dominant conception of the essence of truth: correctness—fact of measurement. For the lecture of Winter Semester 1933–1934 [285–286] 215 Agreement between proposition and thing. From early on and in different worlds: Kant, Thomas, Aristotle. Despite his {Kant’s} definition of cognition , that cognition does not direct itself to objects, but objects to cognition . A proposition that has nothing to do with subjectivism. The common interpretation of Kant. This conception {agreement of proposition and thing} has a peculiar prominence and obstinacy. To decide about it—hopeless! To look at it more closely: 1. so...


Additional Information

Related ISBN
MARC Record
Launched on MUSE
Open Access
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.