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217 Conclusion H ow did the Middle Ages come to construct a notion of mental language quite similar, in certain respects, to that of contemporary philosophers? To answer this question, we identified a multitude of Greek and Latin texts, from Plato through the time of William of Ockham, that feature characteristic expressions evoking, on the one hand, the order of discourse or language and, on the other, the domain of interiority or the mental. (The list “Thirty-six characterizations of interior discourse” recalls the principal expressions.) This varied assortment supplied the raw material of my research at the beginning and circumscribed the corpus with which I worked. The inquiry then revealed how these scattered occurrences could be regrouped into diachronic series that intersect and influence each other in various ways through the centuries. The comparison of human thought to a kind of speech, language, or discourse plays all kinds of roles over the course of this very long period, and even within each stream of transmission, the disputed questions, perspectives, and interests—theoretical as well as practical— are continually repositioned and renewed. As a whole, however, the connections among the many points of the picture thus plotted are sufficiently rich and significant to justify the recognition here of something like a history: the history of what I call the theme of interior discourse. At least the broad outlines of this history are clear. In this matter as in others, medieval reflection finds its sources both in Greek philosophy—which in the wake of Plato and Aristotle had established a technical distinction between logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos—and in the fathers of the church—above all Augustine, who, desiring to discover in man an image of the divine Trinity, had meditated extensively on the interior generation of conscious thought. The encounter of these two traditions in the thirteenth-century university gave rise to a range of precise philosophical discussions on the “mental word,” its ontological status, its role in knowledge, its relation to language, and, especially at the turn of the fourteenth century, on the object of logic, which had become the foundation of intellectual formation. The Ockhamist notion of oratio mentalis, destined for enormous success during the two subsequent centuries, thus took shape. Thirty-six characterizations of interior discourse Greek entos dialogos (Plato) êso logos (Aristotle, Porphyry) F6925.indb 217 F6925.indb 217 10/24/16 12:52:31 PM 10/24/16 12:52:31 PM 218 Conclusion logos endiathetos (Philo of Alexandria, Plutarch, Albinos, Theon of Smyrna, Galen, Ptolemy, Irenaeus of Lyon, Theophilus of Antioch, Hippolytus of Rome, Sextus Empiricus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Nemesius of Emesa, Ammonius, Philoponus, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, Elias, David the Armenian, Stephanus, Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene, John Doxapatres, and others) ho en hêmin logos (Justin) logos en tê psuchê (Plotinus) logos en tê dianoia (Dexippus) endon logos (Proclus) Latin logos fixus in mente (al-Fârâbî in the Latin version) logos interior (Dominicus Gundissalvi, Vincent of Beauvais) verbum endiathetos (Ambrose of Milan) verbum in corde, verbum cordis (Augustine) verbum intrinsecum (Hugh of Saint-Victor) verbum intellectuale (Abelard, William of Auvergne) verbum spirituale (William of Auvergne) verbum interius (Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas) verbum intelligibile (Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Richard Middleton) verbum endiadentum (Albert the Great) verbum mentale (William of Auvergne, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, Peter John Olivi, William of Ware, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and many others) verbum mentis (Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, John of Paris, Thomas Sutton, Hervaeus Natalis, and many others) oratio in animo, intellectus oratio (Boethius) oratio in mente (Boethius, Roger Bacon, Peter of Auvergne, Martin of Dacia, Walter Burley, William of Ockham, and many others) oratio mentalis (Ammonius in the Latin translation by William of Moerbeke, William of Ockham, John Buridan, and others) oratio intelligibilis (Roger Bacon) locutio mentis (Anselm of Canterbury) locutio interior (Avicenna in the Latin version) locutio intellectualis (Abelard, William of Auvergne) locutio intrinseca (Richard of Saint-Victor) locutio in mente (Robert Kilwardby) sermo in anima fixus (Dominicus Gundissalvi) sermo intelligibilis (Philip the Chancellor) sermo interius dispositus (John of La Rochelle) sermo internus (Peter of Spain) sermo in mente, sermo interior (Pseudo-Kilwardby) F6925.indb 218 F6925.indb 218 10/24/16 12:52:31 PM 10/24/16 12:52:31 PM Conclusion 219 sermo endiatheton (Ammonius in the Latin version of William of Moerbeke) diccio mentalis (Roger Bacon) enunciatio in mente (John Duns Scotus, Walter Burley, Richard Campsall) Whatever notion we consider—the...


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