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C H A P T E R I I From Alliance Treaty to Intervention F AR FROM signaling the beginning of "complete" or "almost complete" German domination of the Ottoman empire,1 the alliance treaty of August 2, 1914 was from the outset an arrangement between diplomatic equals, notwithstanding the enormous disparity between the two countries in terms of military, economic, and financial power. The failure of the Germans to convert their alliance with the Turks into a "riderhorse " relationship will be demonstrated in detail in the course of this book. However, it might be noted here that throughout the war the Germans were handicapped most decisively in their policy toward the Turks by the simple fact that they consid­ ered Ottoman military assistance essential for their own war effort. While there were some German officials, notably in the diplomatic service, who had grave doubts about the worth of the Ottoman alliance, virtually all of the top military and po­ litical figures in the Reich came to regard the Ottoman ally as an indispensable partner in the struggle for survival and ulti­ mate victory. It was, above all, this prevailing attitude in Ger­ man government circles that gave theTurks the means to stand up to or even exploit their more powerful ally right up to the end of the war. It has often been suggested that the Germans were not par­ ticularly interested in active Ottoman assistance as long as their own invasion of France seemed to be going well.2 Such 1 Allegations that the Ottoman empire fell increasingly under Ger­ man control after the outbreak of the war are common in Soviet pub­ lications, but may also be found in many Western works. See, for example, A. D. Novichev, E\onomi\a Turtsii υ period mirovoi voini [Turkey's Economy During the World War] (Moscow, 1935), pp. 139-40; Shukov, vii, 572; Howard, pp. 102, 114; Gottlieb, pp. 57-60; Fisher, p. 363. 2 For a rather melodramatic version of this thesis, see Gottlieb, pp. 57-58. From No. 1,107. The "sealed order" in question had originally been drafted on October 22 and read as follows: "The Turkish fleet is to achieve naval supremacy in the Black Sea. Seek out the Russian fleet and attack it wherever you find it without declaration of war." Cf. ibid., Wangenheim to FO, 22 Oct, No. 1,087; Muhlmann, Deutsehland, p. 102; Jackh, Rising Crescent, p. 117; Bayur, 111:1, 233. 80 While this new order made the previously mentioned sealed order (of October 22) essentially superfluous, the latter apparently was given to Souchon as well, with the proviso that he should open it before initiating hostilities. Cf. Jackh Papers, No. 11, Enver to Humann, 24 Oct 1914; Wangenheim's dispatch No. 1,107, Dt 128 Nr. 5 seer., Bd. 4; and Gotthard Jaschke, "Mitteilungen: Zum Eintritt der Tiirkei in den Ersten Weltkrieg," Die Welt des lslams, n.s., 4 (1955), p. 51. From


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