restricted access V: Which Boundaries? Whose History?
In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

141 -Vwhich boundaries? whose history?  From my youth, I remember the last world war, and I know the value of the peace, stability and prosperity which we have today. . . . The wars and atrocities in former Yugoslavia have demonstrated what Europeans can do to each other when forces of disintegration are allowed to overtake the wish for unity. The enlargement of the European Union to me, therefore, is the fulfillment of a vision. —Wim Kok, prime minister of the Netherlands, 2003 When European imperialists march to the east, they eventually lose in the west. The elastic is overstretched. —Simon Jenkins, Sunday Times, June 2005 Boundaries matter. They don’t matter as much as they once did, but the notion that they have dwindled into mere lines on a map is an agreeable fantasy. Despite Google, YouTube , Facebook, e-mails, iPods, cell phones, News International , McDonald’s, Nike, Goldman Sachs, Madonna, climate change, international terrorism, the International Criminal Court, the Red Cross, and the English language, we do not live in a world without borders: try telling an immigration official or a customs officer that you don’t carry a passport because you are a citizen of the world. Capital vaults over national frontiers, but the frontiers are still there to be vaulted over, and state policies help to determine the way in which it vaults. 142 CHAPTER 5 Globalization did not descend like a Hayekian thunderbolt from a clear sky. It was the product of political choices by territorially bounded states, and states respond to it in different ways. In the academy, there is talk of cosmopolitan democracy, but it is a dream for the future, not a reality for the present.1 Germs of a global civil society can be detected in worldwide climate change and anticapitalist protests, in smoothly suited Davos conferences of the World Economic Forum, and in global NGOs like Greenpeace and Médecins Sans Frontières, but so far they are nothing more than germs. Surprisingly large numbers of people think of themselves as global citizens,2 but global citizenship, insofar as it exists, is an adjunct to national citizenship (and in Europe to EU citizenship as well), not the other way around. Political communities are bounded, and so is the European Union. Unlike most political communities in the developed world, however, the Union has experienced extraordinarily rapid and disorientating boundary changes in the space of a few years, and it is still reeling from the effects. These changes and effects have shaped the choices it now faces. History matters too. Shared experiences, however blurred by time, fashion collective identities. Secular non-Zionist Jews, hostile to the policies of the Israeli state, are still marked at some deep level by the experience of the Holocaust , even if they were born after it happened. As Obama’s election campaign showed, the scar of slavery and the memory of the Civil War still mark Americans, both white and black—however faintly in the case of the first. Nostalgia for the glories of the Caliphate surfaces today in the rhetoric of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. And the shared experiences of the cape of Asia we call Europe live on, often in a distorted form, in the psyches of postmodern Europeans in the twenty-first century. To mention only a few examples, 143 WHICH BOUNDARIES? WHOSE HISTORY? the Roman Empire, the schism between the Catholic and Orthodox churches, the Reformation, what used to be called “the expansion of Europe” and is now called imperialism, the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the two world wars have helped to make us what we are—even if we know nothing about them and are not conscious of their legacy. Truisms? Of course, but truisms that are often forgotten in debates about the European Union and its future, and above all about its future extent. For the Union is a successful protest against boundaries and also against history. Part of the point of “uniting men” instead of states was to make national boundaries count for less, and eventually for very much less—not just in the relations between governments and firms, but in the lived experience of ordinary people. In a more complicated way, much the same is true of Monnet ’s second great dream: that of “exorcising the demons of the past.” He did not want history to be forgotten. His vision was rooted in a particular, strongly held, and powerfully expressed interpretation of history. But he did look forward...