Notes
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NOTES INTRODUCTION 1. In addition to Philippe Ariès’s landmark study, The Hour of Our Death, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Vintage, 1982), the post–World War II explosion of thanatology includes Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death (New York: Free Press, 1973); Geoffrey Gorer, Death, Grief, and Mourning (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965); Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, On Death and Dying (New York: Collier, 1969); Robert Jay Lifton, The Broken Connection: On Death and the Continuity of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1979); and Jessica Mitford , The American Way of Death (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963). Stanley B. Burns’s Sleeping Beauty: Memorial Photography in America (Altadena , Calif.: Twelvetrees Press, 1990) is a stunning historical anthology of mortuary photography. 2. Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” trans. Joan Riviere, in General Psychological Theory, ed. Philip Rieff (New York: Collier, 1963), 164– 79. A lucid explication of the psychoanalytic approach to the elegy may be found in “Interpreting the Genre: The Elegy and the Work of Mourning,” chapter 1 of Peter Sacks’s The English Elegy: Studies in the Genre from Spenser to Yeats (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1985), 1–37. While I find Sacks’s readings in the elegiac tradition compelling, even their considerable force is often curtailed by the Procrustean bed of the Freudian paradigm. 3. Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1988), 46. 4. J. B. Schneewind, “The Divine Corporation and the history of ethics,” in Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner, eds., Philosophy in History (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), 173–92. 5. Ariès, The Hour of Our Death, 322–406. 6. J.G.A. Pocock, “Virtues, rights, and manners: A model for historians of political thought,” in Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), 37–50. For a discussion of commerce and gentility in the Enlightenment (“le doux commerce”), see Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph (Princeton : Princeton Univ. Press, 1977), 56–66. 7. Pocock, “Virtues, rights, and manners,” 48. 8. Ibid., 48–49. 9. The received history of Enlightenment moral philosophy, dating back to the Victorians Leslie Stephen and Henry Sidgwick, gives Hume, rather than Smith, pride of place. My account of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments as a response to Hume (and other moral sense philosophers) does, however, intersect with Stephen’s and Sidgwick’s respective accounts of Hume in important ways. Stephen criticizes Hume for lacking a “conception of a social organism” and for “an inadequate view of history,” endemic to his atomistic view of society. But by 242 NOTES TO INTROD UCTION dwelling on Smith’s conceit of the “impartial spectator,” Stephen bypasses Smith’s attempt in his discussion of sympathy at the grave to address Hume’s inadequacy as a social theorist; see English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1881), 2:70–80. Sidgwick, revising his account of Hume and Smith in the third edition of 1892, focuses on Hume’s failure to theorize a link between the moral sense and duty. In Smith’s theory of sympathy, Sigdwick senses an incipient sense of justice; in his theory of conscience, an appeal to general rules of conduct. In both respects, Smith seems to be addressing the sociology, rather than the psychology, of morals; see Sidgwick’s Outlines of the History of Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1902), 204–18. Interest in Adam Smith’s moral philosophy has been stimulated recently by political and economic historians; see n. 6 above and chapter 1, n. 22. 10. Pocock, “Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers: a study of the relations between the civic humanist and the civil jurisprudential interpretation of eighteenth-century social thought,” in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds., Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983), 251. 11. Such an emphasis on the intellectual and affectional underlies what Christopher Herbert calls “the increasing displacement of the biological model of physical function in the name of the philological and linguistic model” in which culture is understood as “‘a system of signs.’” See Christopher Herbert, Culture and Anomie: Ethnographic Imagination in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991), 19; “a system of signs” is drawn (by Herbert) from Foucault’s Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 1973), 357. 12. For a discussion of English Romanticism and the New Historicism see Jon Klancher...


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