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Notes Chapter 1 1. There is a very large literature on each point made in paragraph 1 of this chapter. However, Mayhew (1991) has done much to show that partisanship does not necessarily interfere with the production of legislation. 2. Interview with a former transportation committee staffer, February 20, 2002. This interview, and all subsequent interviews noted, was conducted by the author. The interviews were conducted under rules of my project approval by the Human Subjects Office, Office of the Vice President of Research, University of Georgia. This approval included a stipulation that I would provide all interview subjects with anonymity for agreeing to submit to an interview. Chapter 2 1. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News. 1965. 1: 6. 2. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News. 1965. 1: 22. 3. Taken from the Congressional Record, page H5747, July 24, 1991. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r102:1:./temp/~r102dK58g0:: accessed July 19, 2001. 4. Taken from the Congressional Record, page H5747, July 24, 1991. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r102:1:./temp/~r102dK58g0:: accessed July 19, 2001. 5. Shepsle and Weingast (1987a and 1987b) have argued that committees are powerful because they have an ex post veto over actions taken by the floor (cf. Krehbiel 1987). This ex post veto is exercised when legislation goes to a conference committee, and committee members responsible for the bill are disproportionally represented on conference committees and can veto changes made on the floor to their bill. 6. As quoted from Compilation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. S. Doc. 71, 26. 127 Hall_Notes_3rd.qxd 8/16/2004 4:55 PM Page 127 Chapter 3 1. As Shepsle and Bonchek (1997, 327) note, “exclusive gatekeeping authority [makes it] practically impossible for the full legislature to consider changes in the status quo in a committee’s jurisdiction unless the committee consents to open the gates. This makes a committee an agenda monopolist in its jurisdiction .” 2. The argument made in this section is not contingent on committees being composed of preference outliers (e.g., Shepsle 1978; Weingast and Marshall 1988) or being more heterogeneous in preferences (e.g., Hall and Grofman 1990; Krehbiel 1990, 1991). It is interesting to note, however, that committees are limited in size and there are trade-offs in making them larger (e.g., Munger 1988). In the 105th Congress, almost 20% of the House was on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. 3. Interview with senior manager in the U.S. Department of Education, February 2002. 4. Interview with a congressional staff person who has served on the Education and the Workforce Committee, February 2002. Chapter 4 1. From an interview with a person who has been involved in transportation policy and lobbying, February 18, 2002. 2. The Coast Guard and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission both had an annual authorization prior to 1980. Chapter 5 1. As quoted from Compilation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. S. Doc. 71, 26. 2. Art (1985, 235), with the original quote coming from the National Journal, March 13, 1984: 614. 3. More information about the methodology used in this analysis can be found in the Methodological Appendix. Chapter 7 1. Interview with Department of Education staff person, February 2002. 2. Interview with a congressional staff person who has served on the Education and the Workforce Committee, February 2002. Notes 128 Hall_Notes_3rd.qxd 8/16/2004 4:55 PM Page 128 3. Media coverage was determined by using the Reader’s Guide. The topical headings for each program remained constant over time. 4. In the model shown in table 7.2, the values in the far right column are computed when all variables are held at their mean. Because there are several dummy variables in the model, it is also beneficial to examine the impact of each independent variable on the likelihood that a new law will pass when all other dummy variables were held at either zero or one. Dr. Paul R. Hensel has created“an Excel program that allows the user to calculate expected values from a logistic regression model . . . and [provides] overall expected values for the model as well as changes in the expected values when moving from one value of each variable to another” (http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/Data/logit.xls, last accessed, September 28, 2003). Using this tool, it is possible to calculate the probability of a law being passed if each dummy variable is held at...


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Subject Headings

  • Budget process -- United States.
  • Budget -- United States.
  • United States. Congress -- Committees.
  • Government spending -- United States -- Decision making.
  • United States -- Appropriations and expenditures -- Decision making.
  • Policy sciences.
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