We are unable to display your institutional affiliation without JavaScript turned on.
Shibboleth

Shibboleth authentication is only available to registered institutions.

Project MUSE

Browse Book and Journal Content on Project MUSE
OR

Browse Results For:

Philosophy > Epistemology

previous PREV 1 2 3 4

Results 31-32 of 32

:
:
Ways of Knowing Cover

Access Restricted This search result is for a Book

Ways of Knowing

Kierkegaard's Pluralist Epistemology

M.G. Piety

While Kierkegaard is one of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century, until now very little scholarly attention has been paid to his epistemology. As M. G. Piety explains, this is a serious problem, as Kierkegaard’s views on our ways of knowing are, and must be, intimately related to his view on religious faith and its role in human experience. Thus, in Ways of Knowing, Piety offers the first book-length exploration of Kierkegaard’s views on knowledge, an epistemology that she argues is both foundationalist and nonfoundationalist, substantive and procedural, and includes both internalist and externalist theories of belief justification. In developing, then, a general outline of Kierkegaard’s views, Piety provides the foundational material for future contextualizing and comparative scholarship.

Wittgenstein's Account of Truth Cover

Access Restricted This search result is for a Book

Wittgenstein's Account of Truth

Wittgenstein’s Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements “true.” Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum “meaning is use,” what makes it correct to call a statement “true” is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement “true” is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.

previous PREV 1 2 3 4

Results 31-32 of 32

:
:

Return to Browse All on Project MUSE

Research Areas

Content Type

  • (31)
  • (1)

Access

  • You have access to this content
  • Free sample
  • Open Access
  • Restricted Access