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Contemporary Continental Philosophy in Canada
Philosophical Apprenticeships gathers fresh and innovative essays written by the next generation of Canada's philosophers on the work of prominent Canadian philosophers currently researching topics in continental philosophy. The authors--doctoral students studying at Canadian universities--have studied with, worked with, or been deeply influenced by these philosophers. Their essays present, discuss, and develop the work of their mentors, addressing issues such as time, art, politics, hermeneutics, and phenomenology. The result is a volume that introduces the reader to the work of current Canadian philosophers and to that of their successors, who will soon be making their own contributions to Canadian continental philosophy. Includes articles by Gabriel Malenfant on Bettina Bergo, Saulius Geniusas on Gary Madison, John Marshall on Samuel Mallin, Fran\u00e7ois Doyon on Claude Pich\u00e9, Stephanie Zubcic on Jennifer Bates, Alexandra Morrison on Graeme Nicholson, Scott Marratto on John Russon, and Jill Gilbert on John Burbridge.
This book is a scriptural sculpture of how the physical dimensions of the earth ñbuilt and natural ñ and antecedents of history structure knowledges and the physical containers ñ human and non-human ñ that embody those knowledges. The book deals with universalisms grounded on African experiences and perspectives. A key theme is how (in)security relates to knowledge creation by drawing a parallel between the proliferation of violent conflict in Africa and the marginal position that the continent occupies in the modern formation of knowledge. Also explored is the concept of creativity in relation to art and politics, as experienced by the black African elite. Bottlenecks to African creativity and the role of space and history in the production and reproduction of knowledge and ways of knowing are critically reviewed. The author makes a case for the existence of irreducible forms of knowledge existing in distinct laboratories and traces how particular biological and environment features interact with human cognition to form what passes for knowledge. He interrogates the variety of environment cognition in the light of an increasing homogenization of human cognition globally with a particular accent on climate change. This is a bold and legitimate voice on an important conversation.
The Hidden Necessities
James F. Ross is a creative and independent thinker in contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of mind. In this concise metaphysical essay, he argues clearly and analytically that meaning, truth, impossibility, natural necessity, and our intelligent perception of nature fit together into a distinctly realist account of thought and world. Ross articulates a moderate realism about repeatable natural structures and our abstractive ability to discern them that poses a challenge to many of the common assumptions and claims of contemporary analytic philosophy. He develops a broadly Aristotelian metaphysics that recognizes the "hidden necessities" of things, which are disclosed through the sciences, which ground his account of real impossibility as a kind of vacuity, and which require the immateriality of the human ability to understand. Those ideas are supported by a novel account of false judgment. Ross aims to offer an analytically and historically respectable alternative to the prevailing positions of many British-American philosophers.
Normativity and the Limits of Self-Criticism
The View from Within examines the character of reason and the ability of an individual to effectively distance himself from the normative framework in which he functions in order to be self-critical and innovative. To accomplish this task, Menachem Fisch and Yitzhak Benbaji critically employ or reject the recent writings of Brandom, Friedman, Frankfurt, Walzer, Davidson, Williams, Habermas, Rorty, and McDowell to offer a fundamental analysis of the character of reason and the problem of relativism. This ambitious book forcefully raises the problem of rational normative change and makes the unique and insightful claim that although we cannot be convinced by normative criticism to modify or replace our norms, we can be rationally motivated to do so by the effect of exposure to trusted critics. Its unprecedented analysis, with its solution to the problem of normative self-criticism that has baffled philosophers for the past sixty years, will be welcomed by both students and scholars of philosophy.
Kierkegaard's Pluralist Epistemology
While Kierkegaard is one of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century, until now very little scholarly attention has been paid to his epistemology. As M. G. Piety explains, this is a serious problem, as Kierkegaard’s views on our ways of knowing are, and must be, intimately related to his view on religious faith and its role in human experience. Thus, in Ways of Knowing, Piety offers the first book-length exploration of Kierkegaard’s views on knowledge, an epistemology that she argues is both foundationalist and nonfoundationalist, substantive and procedural, and includes both internalist and externalist theories of belief justification. In developing, then, a general outline of Kierkegaard’s views, Piety provides the foundational material for future contextualizing and comparative scholarship.
Wittgenstein’s Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements “true.” Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum “meaning is use,” what makes it correct to call a statement “true” is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement “true” is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.