Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism: Lessons of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union

4. NYERERE’S INTERIM CONSTITUTION AND KARUME’S EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONALITY

Chapter Four NYERERE’S INTERIM CONSTITUTION AND KARUME’S EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONALITY THE AFTERMATH OF THE UNION Western bloc countries, in particular the USA and UK, were exhilarated at the formation of the Union but kept a low profile preferring to emphasise that the Union was essentially an African initiative.1 Nyerere and Kambona also put out a request that ‘any public statements on Tangovernment–Zanzibar Union be avoided’.2 The immediate concern of the Americans was possible resistance of the Babu faction spurred on by ‘communist states’. To forestall this, USA/UK were prepared to intervene, even militarily, if necessary. The Air Commander of the Royal Air Force (East Africa), I. S. Stockwell, and the General Officer Commanding British Land Forces in Kenya, I. H. Freeland, issued instructions for a possible intervention in Zanzibar.3 They expected resistance from ‘security forces’ under Ali Mahfoudh’s command. Among other things, their task would be to secure strategic points, disarm the opposition, protect British lives, and ‘Protect the life of KARUME and of loyal members of his Government’.4 In the event, the intervention was not necessary. 101 1 Wilson 1989: pp. 76 et. seq. 2 US ambassador Leonhart’s cable to US Secretary of State, 23 April 1964, quoted in Wilson 1989: p. 77. 3 PRO, Commanders Committee East Africa: Joint Operation Instruction No. 2/64, ‘Intervention in Zanzibar’, DO 185/51: Internal Security & Military Intervention’, (064). 4 Ibid.: p. 3. Babu, more or less, embraced the Union. In any case, he was quickly ‘removed’ to the mainland, while his disgruntled followers were left leaderless and without a party. They too, as we shall see, were very soon neutralised by skilful manoeuvres on the part of Nyerere and Karume. The attention of the Western bloc now turned to two other thorny issues. The West Germans were particularly concerned about the fate of German Democratic Republic (GDR) who had been given full diplomatic recognition by Zanzibar while Tanganyika recognised West Germany. This was contrary to their ‘Hallstein’ doctrine. They brought enormous pressure to bear on Nyerere. The other issue, which preoccupied the Americans and the British, was the continued aid – both military and economic – from the East Germans and the Chinese to the revolutionary government. Karume cared little for the concerns of the West, or even Nyerere, so long as the aid assisted him to consolidate his power. Initially, the West thought they would win over Karume by offers of alternative direct aid, a strategy also supported by Nyerere in spite of the fact that aid was a Union matter.5 Karume, however, was extremely suspicious of the West. He would not trade off his ‘Eastern friends’ for Western aid. The West therefore continued to pressurise Nyerere to move faster on ‘integrating’ Zanzibar but found him indecisive and too cautious lest he push Karume to break the Union. The German question came to a head when after some eight months of delicate diplomatic ping-pong, Nyerere arrived at a formula under which Tanzania would not recognise East Germany but GDR would have a Consulate General. Initially, East Germans were opposed but eventually accepted it while the West Germans continued to press for a ‘compromise’, which was unacceptable to Nyerere. Eventually, West Germans withdrew their military aid to put further pressure on Tanzania. Immediately, Nyerere retaliated by asking the West Germans to withdraw all their aid and announcing that 102 Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? 5 PRO, Cable from Foreign Office to Washington, 14 May 1964, PRO, From Dar es Salaam to Commonwealth relations Office, No. 691, 14 May 1964, DO 185/65. Tanzania would resist all ‘economic blackmail’ and that her decisions were not for sale.6 Nyerere typically tried to manoeuvre his way between the East and the West while trying his utmost to maintain the Union. He used the pages of his party paper, The Nationalist, to lash out at foreign powers interfering in the Union. In the course of diplomatic pressures on the German question, The Nationalist carried a vitriolic attack on the East Germans in its issue of 24 June 1964. While affirming that the paper’s criticism of the Western press carried in its pages did not mean that Tanzania was anti-West, the editorial declared that Tanzania would not accept interference from the East either. We have evidence that the East Germans are attempting to destroy our Union in the interests of their own desires...