Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia

Chapter 4: Party Organization and Internal Democracy: Strong Leaders, Influential Branches, Marginalized Members

114 Money, Power, and Ideology 114 4 Party Organization and Internal Democracy Strong Leaders, Influential Branches, Marginalized Members In the view of the cartelization school, the merger of parties with the state and their withdrawal from society has impacted profoundly on their internal organization (Leduc 2001). In the past, mass parties had a “large and homogeneous membership which [claimed] the right to control the party elite” (Katz and Mair 1995: 20), making their period the “Golden Age” of politics (Katz and Mair 2012: 109). By contrast, catch-all parties opened their “ranks to a wider range of supporters,” and “leaders [were] no longer primarily accountable to the members, but rather to the wider electorate.” Accordingly, members were “more like cheerleaders.” In the cartel party, finally, local cadre mobilization has lost even more of its significance, as parties open their decision-making processes to individuals who may be formally members but are not active in branch work. The parties’ leaders and candidates for public office, who were previously determined by party delegates, are today often popularly elected through postal ballot (Fitzgerald, Kennedy, and Lyons 2004; Denham and Dorey 2006; Kenig 2009). Indeed, the election of the Labor Party leader in the United Kingdom in 2010 and the nomination of the French Socialist’s presidential candidate in 2011 fit into this pattern. Thus, while the powers of individual party members in selecting their leadership have grown, the role of long-established cadres in Party Organization and Internal Democracy 115 party organization is declining. Members can now directly relate to party headquarters (often through online communication), and no longer have to interact with the branches. In this “atomistic conception of party membership” (Katz and Mair 1995: 20) in cartelized systems, party branches see their influence reduced but not completely removed. In fact, their autonomy vis-à-vis the central leadership can expand since the latter now often takes a hands-off approach to local party affairs. This is because headquarters no longer has to fear the kind of grassroots challenges from the branches that was common during the period of the mass party. If such challenges still arise, central party leaderships have the option of turning to the entire, individualized membership base to seek a resolution to the conflict. Ultimately, both the center and local branches have an interest in the autonomy of regional levels of party organization. From “the local office-holders’ point of view, a relatively free hand is always desirable, while from the central party side an autonomous local party is more likely to encourage involvement and participation, and is more likely to make the party attractive to potential members and supporters” (Katz and Mair 1995: 20). Overall, the system of party organization under conditions of cartelization is one in which an almost virtual party headquarters rules by occasionally researching the mood of the party base but at the same time detaching itself from the branch network that had previously been the foundation of party politics. Once more, Slater (2004) and Ambardi (2008) do not focus on internal party organization because they refrain from analyzing cartelization at the level of individual parties. This is despite the importance that Katz and Mair assign to the character of cartel parties — for them, cartelization is not possible without the development of a corresponding party type. Indeed, they primarily view their theory as a party, not a party system theory. This chapter, therefore, delivers a detailed analysis of party organization in Indonesia, demonstrating that the features of cartelization identified by Katz and Mair are mostly absent. The chapter’s first section gives an overview of the hierarchy within parties, reviewing the position of their leaders, local branches, and members. In essence, it shows that while the importance of party chairpersons remains high, local party branches have a variety of avenues available to them to get heard. In the second part, the chapter presents an anatomy of a typical Indonesian party congress, highlighting how the interrelationship between the various 116 Money, Power, and Ideology party elements plays out in practice. The final section emphasizes some vital differences between the parties as far as their prospects for more internal party democracy is concerned. The section points to dynastic tendencies in some parties, while others are highly vulnerable to the strength of charismatic leaders or the power of money politics. Ironically, the chapter finds that while there is little evidence of cartelization trends in Indonesia’s...