Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution: The State and Military in Burma, 1962‒88

Preface

xix PREFACE Every era has its share of “crooked” governments. Burma, a country at the western edge of Southeast Asia, is a perfect example of crooked government in our age. For half a century from 2 March 1962, when the tatmadaw (the Burma Armed Forces) seized power in a coup d’état, until 2011 and the establishment of a “civilian-led” (but military influenced) parliament form of government, Burma was ruled by a military junta that grew all the more anachronistic in the region as the decades passed. Even the massive anti-government movements that broke out all over the country in 1988 resulted not in democratization as occurred in neighbouring Thailand and nearby Indonesia, but in suppression, coup d’état and harsher authoritarian rule by the tatmadaw. The brutal aftermath of 1988 and subsequent military rule earned Burma pariah status in the international community, leading the U.S. and EU to impose economic sanctions against the country. The junta’s ill treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi, the hugely popular and internationally acclaimed leader of Burma’s democracy movement, the years of oppressive house arrest that she heroically endured, and the continual brutal suppression of her political followers reinforced that status for two long decades. To outside observers including me it seemed that Burma’s relentlessly suppressive military regime was set to remain in power, robust and unchallengeable. However, to the surprise of practically everyone who has been watching Burma, the situation in the country has begun to change rapidly. The 2010 general election, the first to be held in Burma in two decades, was followed by a shift to a new regime in March 2011. The new president, Thein Sein, who was the prime minister in the previous junta, has astonished people around the world with his announcement of reforms and reconciliation with the democratic forces in the society, contrary to expectations that the new government would simply aim to perpetuate the military’s dominance in another disguise. The reforms and Aung San Suu Kyi’s decision to participate in the new parliament have created a favourable international environment which led the U.S. to ease financial sanctions on Burma in April 2012 and lift its ban on imports from that country in September. So far the reform since 2011 has been widely accepted both inside and outside of Burma. What is going to happen next? Will the reform really progress toward a full-fledged democracy? Or should we be ready for an eventual backlash from anti-reform forces in the ruling elite? This study seeks to find answers to these questions from a historical perspective by examining the causes of the durability of the socialist military regime created by General Ne Win, which lasted from 1962 to 1988 and left institutional legacies for the post-1988 junta. My argument is as follows. In order to build the socialist state in Burma, General Ne Win gave a small cadre of military officers an opportunity to dominate the pivotal posts of the government and the political party he created, which allowed him to retain an iron grip on power for a long period and at the same time created an incentive structure that maintained the cohesion of the ruling elite, namely the officer corps of the tatmadaw. Although Ne Win’s rule collapsed in 1988, the power structure and informal institutional legacy created by Ne Win has remained intact. I would go so far as to say that Ne Win’s failed revolution made the strong military regime in Burma. Even though we are witnessing reforms toward a more democratic polity today, I believe that a historical analysis that seeks to explain the robustness of the previous military regime can provide great insights into exploring the consequences of the drastic changes currently taking place in Burma. By including theoretical analysis and comparative studies between Burma and other countries, I also seek to set forth some broader implications from the perspective of political science. ✻ ✻ ✻ This book is based on the Japanese edition, titled Gunsei Biruma no Kenryoku Kōzō: Ne Win Taisei ka no Kokka to Guntai (The Power Structure of the Military Regime in Burma — The State and Military under the Ne Win Regime), published by Kyoto University Press in June 2009. In translating the book into English, I made some modifications to its structure and contents, and I slightly expanded my theoretical analysis; but basic argumentation and its factual verification have remained the...