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Post-1988 Politics 291 291 EPILOGUE Post-1988 Politics The tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces), currently boasting a force of about 400,000 (Army: 375,000; Navy: 16,000; Air Force: 15,000), is an organization designed to defend national security and is the political backbone that has consistently supported the juntas since 1962. Since Independence, the tatmadaw’s major duty has been counter-insurgency operations against communists and ethnic minority rebels. Its goal has been to establish a unified state free of armed struggle. The political role of the tatmadaw remained largely unchanged: to support Myanmar’s authoritarian regime; and the system that Ne Win created is still working today. Since 1988 Myanmar has experienced great changes in its politics, economy, society, and culture. Economic development has progressed through a transition to a market-oriented economy. Shops abound with goods compared with the past, and electric appliances such as televisions and air conditioners have become widespread. Automobiles and motorbikes are no longer rare even in the countryside, and Yangon and Mandalay boast luxury hotels. Exchanges with other countries have increased, and students and workers abroad now number several million. Controls on newspapers, television, periodicals, and other mass media were not relaxed until 2011; nonetheless, the media are much more diverse at present than in the socialist era. Urban residents can now easily access the Internet. The development of the media has provided greater means for gaining general information about Myanmar. However, information about civil-military relations still remains limited; to a considerable extent we are forced to rely on hearsay and guesswork for analysis. What we can do, though, is stand back and try to understand Myanmar’s civilmilitary relations after 1988 from a broader perspective. 292 Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution What has changed politically since 1988? To see the changes, we need to look back at the words that the military regime used to justify and legitimize its government. These were “revolution” and “the Burmese way to socialism,” on which the Ne Win regime stood from 1962 to 1988. The goal was to set in place a revolution in the Burmese way, backed by the tatmadaw. But on 18 September 1988, Saw Maung, the Chief of General Staff of the tatmadaw, staged a coup, suspended the 1974 Constitution, and concentrated all state powers in the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). As the name of this organization implies, the legitimacy of this assumption of power was sought in the restoration of order, and in this light the military regime continued without interruption and without debate for another 20 years. During that time, the tatmadaw justified its rule by claiming to be both as a provisional government holding power until democratization and a nonpartisan government that would benefit the entire nation. It is clear, however, the junta’s words to justify its rule did not persuade the people in effect, one main reason being the fact that 22 years is simply too long for a provisional government. Rather, it seems that the more the tatmadaw promised future democratization and service in the national interest, the more the words lost their meaning. Clearly, this was because the SLORC, backed as it was by the physical force of the military, could make any number of empty promises, leaving one with the impression that the function of the junta’s formal pronouncements seems to have been to restrain any action that might have opposed the legitimacy of the regime. A reliance on physical force against opposition and the emptiness of its words highlighted the weak legitimacy of the junta from 1988 to 2010. Moreover, neither Saw Maung, who led the coup d’état in 1988, nor Than Shwe, who took over as the leader of the state in 1992, possessed the charismatic qualities that might have made up for the regime’s lack of legitimacy. Under the SLORC and its reincarnation, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the tatmadaw lost all but a shadow of the respect it had previously earned as the army that had fought for the freedom of the nation. The legitimacy of the post-1988 military regime was seemingly more fragile than that of the Ne Win regime at the time of the latter’s collapse. Yet the regime endured and did so until the tatmadaw guided transition to a “civilian” government in 2011. How was Than Shwe able to control the tatmadaw and the state for so long? How did the military...

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