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194 CHAPTER VII Eclipse of the Ulèëbalang “The wheel of the universe turns, giving rise to events both horrifying and joyful. Once his time has come, no man can escape his fate. Even so with the aristocracy of North Aceh, whose time for living tyrannously had truly run out. Willing or unwilling, they had to bow before the law of life and the will of the times, bringing their destiny towards its ruin.” Abdullah Arif, 1946 Expectations If there was one part of Indonesia where outsiders expected special difficul­ ties to follow the Japanese surrender, it was Aceh. The militant anti-Dutch tradition of the Acehnese and their successful 1942 uprising were guarantees that at least there the pre-war order could not readily be reimposed. A number of Japanese sought to take advantage of this Acehnese tradition. Four days after he must have heard the Imperial broadcast announcing surrender Masubuchi gave one of his fieriest speeches, appealing for resistance to the Allies as if the war was still on. The readiness of the Acehnese to continue the war which Japan had lost seemed still more certain in faraway Singapore, especially to the intelligence section of the 7th Area Army. Known as the Ibaragi kikan, this section continued some of the intelligence and 5th column work of the earlier Fujiwara kikan. Its commander, Major T. Ishizima, and his two principal  Abdullah Arif, Disekitar Peristiwa Pengchianat Tjoembok (Kutaraja, 1946), p. 26. This source will henceforth be cited from my English translation “The affair of the Tjoembok traitors”, in RIMA, 4/5 (1970/71), pp. 36‒57.  Talsya, in Sinar Darussalam, 11 (1969), p. 79. 07 BP.indd 194 2/27/14 1:25:58 PM Eclipse of the Ulèëbalang 195 assistants were all from the Nakano intelligence school, whose graduates were explicitly prepared to remain behind as guerrilla organizers in the event of a Japanese retreat or surrender. The two assistants had both worked in Sumatra until transferred to Singapore in April 1944. Captain Adachi Takashi had built his intelligence network primarily in Aceh and Captain Kondo Tsugio in Medan, establishing what contacts they could among radical nationalists. The three men decided that Aceh was the place in which they should hold out while awaiting the second great battle for Asia which would surely come. Aoki Eigoro, the hero of pusa’s takeover of the judiciary, was invited to join the three to ensure their warm reception by the Acehnese. Having incautiously mentioned this plan to the unemployed pilots they had been retraining for guerrilla work, the Nakano men were overwhelmed by the pilots’ enthusiasm to join it. Two small ships had to be commandeered to take 150 Japanese and a large quantity of arms, ammunition, and saleable cloth to Sumatra on the night of 19 August. One ship appears to have landed in Siak, and its leaders were arrested on their way through East Sumatra on the authority of General Itagaki. The other succeeded in reaching Langsa, but even in Aceh the response of the Japanese military hierarchy was disappointing. Most Japanese were aware of rising Acehnese resentment and wanted only to get out of the region safely. Despite their attempts to buy favour with handouts of cloth, arms, and even gold, Ishizima’s men also found an increasingly hostile reception from Acehnese. By the end of September most of them were back in Japanese barracks. Although Aceh was probably more favoured by Japanese deserters than any other Indonesian region, most of those who remained were obliged to become Muslims and seek an influential Acehnese protector. The Japanese surrender had been announced by the Atjeh Sinbun on 22 August, though a few Acehnese had been kept informed from the beginning. The day before the public announcement Giyūgun and Heiho soldiers had been disarmed and dispersed to their villages, most of them too astonished  Statements of Major Ishizima Tadakazu, November 1946; Captain Adachi Takashi, 31 October 1946; and General Shimura Fumie, 13 June 1946; RvO I.C. 059300, 059301, and 009406, respectively. Interviews Adachi Takashi and Aoki Eigoro, August 1973.  Abdullah Hussain, Peristiwa (Kuala Lumpur, Pustaka Antara, 1965), pp. 93‒4. In an interview Adachi Takashi gave as a reason for not defying Itagaki’s order to abandon the plan of the Nakano group their sense of responsibility for the inexperienced pilots who had come with them. General Shimura, on the other hand, adduced their hostile reception by Acehnese. 07 BP.indd 195 2/27/14 1:25...

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