To Cage the Red Dragon

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Table of Contents

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pp. v-vi

List of Maps

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pp. vii-viii

Acknowledgements

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pp. ix-xii

I would first like to thank my friends and colleagues at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales campus, Australian Defence Force Academy, particularly Professors Jeffrey Grey, Peter Dennis and Dr John Connor for their encouragement, support and friendship over the years. Jeff and Peter’s efforts to encourage and assist former students to actually become working ...

Introduction

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pp. 1-6

It is now 20 years since the Cold War effectively ended with the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union and its client states in Eastern and Central Europe, and just over three decades since the final bloody climax of the Vietnam War played itself out on the streets of Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane. The historiography of the wider Cold War has burgeoned accordingly, greatly assisted by increasing access ...

Chapter 1. SEATO's Place in the Cold War

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pp. 7-28

Th e Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was created as a direct result of the First Indochina War, but as such it was only one element of the wider Cold War. Th is conflict, born amidst the dying embers of the Second World War, and by some measures, not yet entirely consigned to history, enveloped most of the entire planet ...

Chapter 2. The Conventional Military Threat

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pp. 29-59

By late 1954, the potential threat to Southeast Asia posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and to a lesser extent, the People’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN), was one that could not be ignored by the United States and its allies. Th e Korean War had demonstrated the PRC’s readiness and ability to intervene and fight ...

Chapter 3. SEATO's Military Organisation 1955-1965

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pp. 60-88

Having established that the PRC, and to a lesser extent the DRVN, presented a credible threat to the security of Southeast Asia, we must now turn to SEATO’s response. By itself, the Manila Treaty and the statements of intent contained within its articles would not be enough to deter communist aggression. If those statements were to have any ...

Chapter 4. SEATO's Strategic Concepts

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pp. 87-120

Th e military advisers agreed that before any substantial planning could take place, the alliance members needed to agree upon a set of strategic concepts. Throughout 1955 and 1956, a series of Staff Planners’ Meetings were held to produce this framework. These took place against the backdrop of a range of different strategic priorities brought to the meetings by each SEATO member. Some of these were complementary ...

Chapter 5. Planning for Limited War

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pp. 121-152

With the establishment of SEATO’s strategic concepts and the creation of the MPO, the stage was set to begin turning those concepts into viable contingency plans dealing with specific scenarios. Planning at this level would involve the acquisition of highly detailed knowledge of the region in general, equally detailed knowledge of the PLA’s and PAVN’s capabilities and potential objectives, the creation of ...

Chapter 6. Plan 5: The First Counter-Insurgency Plan

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pp. 153-178

At the SEATO Staff Planners’ Meetings of 1955–1956, the alliance had designated planning for limited war contingencies as SEATO’s first priority. Counter-insurgency, while recognised as a key element of the Communist threat to the region, was something to study, share intelligence on and monitor, but for political and operational reasons, it was felt that insurgent threats facing member states were best ...

Chapter 7. SEATO Counter-Insurgency Planning for South Vietnam and Thailand 1960-1963

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pp. 179-203

Thai confidence in SEATO was badly shaken by the failure of the alliance to agree on the need to activate Plan 5. They were frustrated and annoyed by opposition of the United Kingdom and France to such action. However, the fact that the United States had eventually concurred with the British assessment of the situation in practice, if not in principle, and had committed itself to supporting the Geneva ...

Chapter 8. The Beginning of the End 1964-1965

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pp. 204-235

As the SEATO alliance moved into its ninth year, it still commanded the active support of the United States and as such was still the preeminent forum for coordinating Western defence strategy in Southeast Asia. But as 1964 unfolded, Washington began to reassess SEATO’s usefulness in this regard in light of the growing unilateral American ...

Appendix 1. The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact)

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pp. 236-240

Appendix 2. CMPO Biographies 1957-1965

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pp. 241-246

Appendix 3. The SEATO Emblem

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pp. 247-249

Glossary

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pp. 250-252

Notes

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pp. 253-287

Bibliography

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pp. 288-299

Index

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pp. 300-324