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188 Hardening National Security: Emergence of an Agile Scorpion ZACHARY ABUZA1 When Goh Chok Tong became prime minister in 1990, Southeast Asia was arguably at its most secure point in the post-Second World War era. Vietnam had withdrawn from Cambodia in September 1989, and had begun to open its economy. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven had declared ASEAN’s intentions to “turn battlefields into marketplaces”. While there was some concern about the US military withdrawal from the Philippines in 1991, the Cold War in Southeast Asia was clearly over. Regional border disputes were being negotiated diplomatically or through international arbitration, while the number of irredentist claims had dropped. Insurgencies lingered in Aceh, West Papua and the Southern Philippines, but were also for the most part geographically contained. Not only has Singapore always seen a strong American presence in the region as imperative to regional security, it has gone out of its way to keep American forces anchored in the region. Goh continued the tradition of placing a premium on the alliance with the United States (US). Yet by the end of Goh’s tenure in 2004, the region’s security environment had dramatically changed, and under his leadership, Singapore adapted well to new threats. The country maintained its “scorpion” approach to inter-state conflict by sustaining a potent deterrent capability through qualitative and quantitative conventional military superiority vis-à-vis its neighbours, while at the same time adapting to more threats from sub-state actors, in particular Islamist terrorism posed by Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda affiliated group. At the same time, Singapore under Goh became more committed to multilateralism, participating for the first time in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations as well as taking the diplomatic lead—to the degree that Singapore could— in fostering regional security cooperation. While the Singapore government would have reacted to many of these emerging threats and changed security environments in a similar manner even without Goh, clearly his long experience in security affairs and policy making played an important role in preserving the continuity and consistency of policies as well as sharpening their effectiveness. 17 HARDENING NATIONAL SECURITY 189 The Scorpion: Enhancing Singapore’s Deterrent Capability As Minister of Defence from 1982–1991, Goh had considerable experience in the security realm. In that period, the Republic of Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) became arguably the most advanced and sophisticated in the region. The 50,000-man army and 200,000 reservists were well trained and equipped with advanced equipment. Singapore’s air force at the time was second to none in the region, boasting more advanced fighter jets than any of its much larger neighbours. It boasted 150 planes, including three squadrons of F-16s, as well as A-4s, aerial refuelling capability, maritime reconnaissance, and 20 Apache AH-64D Longbow attack helicopters. Singapore’s navy also went from being a coastal force to a bona fide navy, with blue-water offensive capabilities. Its six stealth frigates, commissioned between 2004 and 2006,and six missile corvettes are the most advanced craft in the region, giving Singapore a range of several thousand nautical miles. Singapore also acquired four Sjoormen class submarines from Sweden to counter any attempt to blockade its vital sea lanes of communication. In 2005, it announced the purchase of two advanced Vastergotland-class submarines and stepped up cooperation and training with Sweden. Singapore’s navy capabilities dwarfed that of the Indonesian navy. While other states in the region engaged in their own rounds of military purchases and military modernisation, Singapore began the 1990s well ahead, and surpassed its neighbours in both the number and sophistication of new weapons systems. During Goh’s tenure, Singapore signed a series of agreements that allowed its military forces to conduct long-term training overseas. The bilateral agreement with Taiwan was perhaps the most sensitive. While Taiwan was one of the first states to offer Singapore access to training facilities in the 1970s, Singapore has always remained highly sensitive to offending Beijing since it did not establish full diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) until 1998. Although training in Taiwan continues, there are neither joint exercises nor any type of alliance; Singapore insists that this is a completely commercial transaction involving the leasing of training facilities. Less sensitive but equally important were strong relationships with Australia, Thailand, New Zealand and Brunei. Singapore and Australia signed a five-year training agreement on 23 August 2005 that allows SAF personnel to train at Australia...

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