Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore

16 Maturing the Singapore Armed Forces: From Poisonous Shrimp to Dolphin

178 Maturing the Singapore Armed Forces: From Poisonous Shrimp to Dolphin BERNARD FOOK WENG LOO The Goh Chok Tong administration remains probably the most important period in the growthanddevelopmentoftheSingaporeArmedForces(SAF)intoacredibleconventionally structured, jointly oriented armed forces, plausibly the most modern and most well-trained armed forces in Southeast Asia. Singapore’s defence postures have evolved from its inception from “poisonous shrimp” to “porcupine” to “dolphin”, signifying a shift from a purely defensive deterrent policy to a more offensive (and prickly) deterrent posture to one that emphasises agility and adaptability, all the while retaining the ability to administer a swift and decisive victory when threatened.1 From its difficult inception, the SAF has grown steadily, moving from its first-generation incarnation as a counter-insurgency force to its second-generation incarnation as a modern and conventionally-trained organisation, to its next incarnation as the Third Generation Singapore Armed Forces or 3G SAF, an agenda that taps into the cutting edge of technological and doctrinal developments. This would not have been possible if the SAF had not been undergoing steady modernisation throughout its existence, much of it occurring in the period of the 1980s through to the 1990s. This essay will begin with a brief examination of how the SAF evolved from its inception, from poisonous shrimp through to porcupine. It will then examine the history of the SAF under the Goh administration, its evolution into the dolphin phase and the transformation agenda of the 3G SAF. A methodological caveat is important here. The absence of hard information about decisionmaking,alreadyprevalentintherealmof Singaporepoliticsbutevenmorepervasive in Singapore defence issues, makes it difficult to determine the extent of responsibility the political leadership, whether in its entirety or aspects of the political leadership, has in the various defence programmes examined in this essay. Inasmuch as these programmes occurred under the watch of Goh Chok Tong, this essay assumes that at least some degree of responsibility can therefore be accrued. 16 MATURINGTHE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES 179 The EarlyYears: From Poisonous Shrimp to Porcupine From its independence through to the early 1980s, Singapore faced a security environment that, at least to its policy makers, remained fairly constant. From the global (the Cold War) to the regional (the Cambodian conflict) to the immediate (the history of Konfrontasi with Indonesia and threats from Malaysia to cut off the island’s water supply), the dominant image was one of potential trouble that could directly or indirectly affect the security of Singapore. Singapore had to create its armed forces. Given Singapore’s small population, conscription was seen as the only means for building a large armed forces. There were, of course, other non-military, more nation-building, agendas that underpinned the conscription strategy as well. From 1965 to 1974, a group of Israeli military advisors played a central role in the emergence of the SAF, ensuring that the SAF’s development mirrored that of its Israeli counterpart in terms of weapons platforms, conscription and doctrines.2 In addition, Singapore leaders quickly realised the need for high-technological trade-offs relative to the small population base in order to develop credible military power, resulting in a commitment to a comparatively high level of military spending to acquire sophisticated weapon systems and to develop an indigenous defence industry.This commitment to high defence spending was reinforced by the British decision in 1969 to withdraw British troops “east of the Suez”. Given the weak nature of the SAF at this point, the strategy was characterised as one of creating a “poisonous shrimp” capability—the SAF would be defeated in a war with any of its neighbours but would, in the process, cause the attacking state’s armed forces high levels of destruction in what Tim Huxley, in his book Defending the Lion City, characterised as a “Stalingrad-style” defence of every square inch of the city-state. The idea was that, hopefully, the thought of suffering such high levels of casualties would be sufficiently painful to deter a potential aggressor from attacking Singapore. By the late 1970s, the SAF’s buildup of capabilities had resulted in a situation that increasingly contradicted the poisonous shrimp strategy and created a pressing need to reformulate Singapore’s basic defence doctrines. Even during the poisonous shrimp years, the long-term vision was clearly oriented towards the acquisition of capabilities that strongly suggested a defence strategy of offensive preemption. Furthermore, Singapore’s conscription policy was becoming a major success. Between 1965 and 1978, the size of the...