Britain and the Neutralisation of Laos

Chapter Eight. The Princes’ Meeting in Geneva

Princes’ Meeting in Geneva 325 CHAPTER EIGHT The Princes’ Meeting in Geneva ‘There was much discussion at the Prime Minister’s house of the problem of winning agreement between a pro-Communist prince, an anti-Communist prince, and a neutral prince.’ – J.K. Galbraith Persuading Phumi If the practice of the current ICC was seen as an indication of the prospects of the future ICC, it was not encouraging. There had been no agreement on visiting ‘sensitive areas’, nor over the attendance of Commission members at the Ban Namon meetings. The ceasefire was, however, generally being maintained, the Commission reported late in June, and the meeting of the three princes at Zurich was ‘beneficial’.1 The following month there was still no agreement, but there were fewer incidents.The Commission had not been able to carry out ‘active supervision’, but believed that each side was carrying out military preparations, and that they might resort to force in default of satisfactory agreements.2 The September message suggested that the situation was ‘reasonably calm’, but no investigations had taken place. Nor had there been any progress in the military talks. The two parties spent two weeks vainly discussing whether the date of the ceasefire should be fixed at 25 April, the date of the Co-Chairmen’s appeal, or 3 May, the date all parties declared it, Viang Chan preferring the first date, Xiang Khuang the second. The ceasefire, the Commission considered, was ‘tenuous and temporary’: unless there were ‘a political settlement or a detailed cease-fire agreement in the near future the situation may rapidly deteriorate’.3 After the princes met at Ban Hin Heup [6–8 October 1961], no further meeting took place, despite Suvanna’s repeated suggestions of a meeting on the Plaine des Jarres. The delay in reaching a political settlement 325 326 Britain and the Neutralisation of Laos increased tension, the ICC reported. On 27 October it received reports of shelling in and around Xiang Khuang: the house in which the Polish delegation was staying received a direct hit, and five children were killed in a French mission school. Fearing that the situation might get out of control, the Commission addressed a message to the parties. It suggested that the Co-Chairmen should do so, too.4 MacDonald produced a text, which his Russian colleague referred to Moscow. Perhaps it should be pressed there?5 That was not as simple as it looked, Warner minuted. ‘I would hold this up or let it fizzle out,’ Home wrote.6 Pushkin seemed to object to the message because it would go to all three princes, the FO noted in its reply to MacDonald, ‘thereby assuming that any hold-up is equally the fault of all three’. The Russians might produce a counter-proposal, directed only to Viang Chan, ‘to which we could not agree’. Their rejection of the proposal would, however, make ‘a bad impression on the Indians’ and most of the other delegations, ‘and we shall have lost nothing’. It was better to wait for their response than put pressure on them.7 ‘[A]ny effective persuasion [of Phumi]’, the telegram declared, ‘must in the end come from the Americans’, and would have to be ‘a clear statement that they will not support him if he rejects national reconciliation in favour of renewed civil war’. At a reception in the Kremlin, Kuznetsov told Roberts that it was important to achieve a quick settlement and that he hoped the British could persuade the Americans to bring the necessary influence to bear on Boun Oum. Also at the party, Ho Chi Minh told the Canadian ambassador that the prospects at Geneva seemed ‘good’, if only the three princes could reach agreement.8 Unenthusiastic over a message to the princes, Home was, however, interested in a ‘final’ attempt to press Phumi.9 The Moscow telegram was ‘encouraging’, but time was ‘running very short’. Ormsby Gore was thus instructed to speak to Kennedy or Rusk at the earliest opportunity. ‘You might say that we are now at a position at Geneva where all the world can see that an agreement on Laos is possible.’ It was also well known that the King of Laos had agreed to accept Suvanna as prime minister if he could form a government. It would be known, however, that the formation of such a government was being obstructed by Viang Chan’s unwillingness to undertake the necessary discussions and that Phumi was trying to frustrate them by...