Britain and the Neutralisation of Laos

Chapter Seven. The Future Role of the Co-Chairmen

280 Britain and the Neutralisation of Laos CHAPTER SEVEN The Future Role of the Co-Chairmen ‘Laos is a funny country; it has got a funny King and a funny cease-fire; and there are funny negotiations going on at Geneva. And, tomorrow, if peace were to come from them, it would be a funny peace.’ – Combat, 16 May 1961 Discussing and drafting At the first restricted session of the Geneva conference, discussion focused on the kind of documents required for an international guarantee of Laotian neutrality, ‘with general emphasis’, as Modelski puts it, ‘on the need not to dictate to or interfere with the future Laotian National Government’,1 or, it might be said, with the appearance of such an emphasis. The Western countries and South Vietnam supported the French proposal that there should be two declarations, and the Indian delegate agreed: the government should first state its policy, and the conference should respond. The Communist powers wanted there to be only one declaration, made by the 14-member conference. Finally Pushkin proposed and others agreed that the discussion should be postponed until a national government was formed. A session on 24 July debated the preamble to the international declaration on neutrality. Participants generally agreed on certain principles: respect for the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Laos. The French wanted to add ‘neutrality’. Canada and Britain wanted a direct reference to the 1954 agreements, while the US thought that some elements of them no longer applied. South Vietnam wanted to include a clause committing participants to refrain from using Laos as a base for interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries. The Soviet, Chinese and Polish delegates argued that that should be considered later, being a matter of substance, not principle. A committee was set up to combine relevant parts of the French, Soviet and Indian drafts.2 Next day, 280 Future Role of the Co-Chairmen 281 after a consensus was reached on international undertakings not to attach conditions to offers of aid, not to interfere in internal affairs, and not to involve the country in alliances incompatible with its neutrality, that matter, too, was referred to the drafting committee, which included China, France, India, the SU and the UK.3 At the debate on 26 July, Zhang Hanfu spoke on the SEATO treaty. ‘It was unthinkable,’ he said, ‘that the Conference should reach an agreement in principle not to involve Laos in military alliances incompatible with its status of neutrality and yet permit the existence of treaties which did just that.’4 SEATO was ‘a 100% aggressive military bloc’.5 Though his government opposed SEATO, Lall said, the decision lay with the Laotians. ‘If they had stated that they did not recognize the protection of any military alliance, as in fact the Zurich communique had done, then it was contrary to international courtesy for any government to consider it possible to involve Laos in such an alliance.’ SEATO was a defensive military alliance, Harriman responded. It could act on Laos’ behalf only at its request. An amendment of the treaty would have to be approved by the US Senate. On the 28th MacDonald declared that the inclusion of the Soviet clause calling for the cancellation of SEATO’s obligations to Laos would interfere with the rights of governments not at the conference. Other speeches followed. There being obvious disagreement, the conference proceeded to the next item.6 It was ‘a tough but good tempered two day debate’.7 The restricted session on 31 July dealt with the withdrawal of foreign troops. Pushkin suggested that it should be covered both in the declaration on neutrality and in the attached protocol. MacDonald thought that, in order to avoid extended discussion, the question should be studied only in relation to the protocol. Harriman said the US was quite ready to withdraw its advisers. It could accept the Soviet draft, with the addition of a phrase that referred to the protocol amending and supplementing the 1954 agreement.8 Next day, 1 August, the restricted session focused on the commitment not to introduce foreign troops or military personnel into Laos and not to allow their presence or transit. The Polish delegate, Naszkowski, criticised the French provision, which covered troops but not personnel, and, while providing that Laos should not accept military instructors, made an exception for those covered in the 1954 agreement. The instructoral mission had been maintained with the agreement of the Laos government, Roux responded, and had...