Britain and the Neutralisation of Laos

Chapter Six. The Zurich Agreement

232 Britain and the Neutralisation of Laos CHAPTER SIX The Zurich Agreement ‘The tragedy of Laos was that it had so few competent people and these would not cooperate.’ – King Savangvatthana The communiqué From 19 June the three princes, along with Phumi, met in Zurich, together with Cambodian representatives. Steeves, who went to Zurich on 20 June, brought back ‘gloomy reports’, borne out by the information received by the British delegation. The Cambodians had prepared draft provisions on the control, incorporating many of the features of the Soviet draft, including the double veto. Nor did it seem that the RLG representatives could hold out against the pressure of Suvanna Phuma, ‘with support from the Cambodians as well as the Communists’.1 Suvanna, Harlan Cleveland told the Australians in Washington, was ‘intransigent’. There were, he said, the ‘first signs’ of new Suvanna/Suphanuvong tactics, which would seek to apply the ‘troika’ principle to all the organs of government. That would give the PL a veto.2 Harriman, the British delegation reported, appeared nevertheless to have persuaded himself that there was no alternative to working through Suvanna and that he was the only likely prime minister. He also told MacDonald ‘that though in the past he had been in favour of the introductions [sic] of S.E.A.T.O. troops into Laos in a purely holding role, he personally now considered that the time for any such action had passed and that the use of force by S.E.A.T.O. must be ruled out’. He planned to advise Phumi to hold out against extreme demands but ‘to continue working for a government of national union on tolerable terms’. He also thought the three powers should consider how to persuade Suvanna that accepting reasonable terms for the ICC was in his own interests.3 He should act ‘like real neutral he claims to be’.4 232 Zurich Agreement 233 The three princes issued a communiqué on 22 June.5 Meeting ‘to discuss the problem of realising national accord through the formation of a Government of national union’, they had discussed the political programme and the immediate tasks of the provisional government of national union. The aim was to build ‘a peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos’. Internally, the provisional government would execute the ceasefire agreement agreed by the three parties in Laos; restore democratic liberties and the electoral law of 1957; ‘[d]efend the unity, neutrality, independence and national sovereignty of Laos’; ‘[e]nsure peace and justice to all citizens’; ‘[r]ealise the unification of the armed forces of the three parties in a single National Army according to a programme agreed by the parties’; develop the economy and infrastructure and improve the standard of living. Externally, the government would ‘resolutely’ apply the five principles of co-existence and develop relations with all countries, in the first place with the neighbouring ones. It would not participate in any military alliance or coalition, nor permit the establishment of any foreign military base, the bases figuring in the 1954 agreement, it was understood, being ‘the object of a special study’. It would not permit any country ‘to use Laotian territory for military ends’, nor ‘recognize the protection of any military alliance or coalition’. Nor would it permit any foreign interference [ingérence] in the affairs of Laos ‘in any form’. It would demand the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel, and not permit their introduction. It would accept ‘direct [i.e. bilateral] and unconditional aid from all countries which desire to help Laos in building an autonomous national economy on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of Laos’. The immediate tasks for the government were to form a delegation to the conference; to realise a ceasefire; to honour commitments undertaken at the conference and ‘carry out seriously the agreements concluded among the three interested parties in Laos’; to set all prisoners-of-war and detainees free; and to organise general elections ‘with a view to forming a definite Government’. In the transitional period ‘the administrative organs established during the hostilities will be left in place provisionally’. That was a reference to the PL structures in Xam Neua, Phongsali and Xiang Khuang. No new government was formed. Instead the three princes agreed on two principles. First, the government of national union would be comprised of representatives of the three parties and be provisional. Second, it would be formed ‘according to a special procedure by direct designation and nomination by HM...