Britain and the Neutralisation of Laos

Chapter Five. The Opening of the Geneva Conference

188 Britain and the Neutralisation of Laos CHAPTER FIVE The Opening of the Geneva Conference The two Foreign Ministers, Khrushchev said, ‘should be locked in a room and told to find a solution. Mr Gromyko interjected that the Palais des Nations in Geneva was a big place with a lot of rooms.’ Gromyko’s documents The conference had finally opened in Geneva on the evening of 16 May, though neither the RLG, South Vietnam nor Thailand was represented. Sihanouk ‘arrived in time, rather to everyone’s surprise, made a general opening speech and retired’.1 He recalled his proposal for a neutral zone, including Cambodia and Laos, greeted with scepticism, he said, but Suvanna had taken up the idea and suggested including Burma. ‘I am told that certain powers envisage the replacement of Burma by the republic of South Vietnam or Siam,’ he said. ‘This seems rather curious to me, because these last named countries — or at least their Governments — have up to now shown little desire for neutralization. But what form could this neutralization of Laos take which in any case I should like to be extended to Cambodia?’ The Communist bloc, he noted, admired the Austrian formula, and the West agreed. ‘We are not at all annoyed that they did not like a Cambodia style neutrality,’ he said. The division of Austria would have lasted longer if the four powers had not agreed to end the occupation. ‘Why could this procedure not be applied to Laos, and why should the great Powers refuse to Laos and Cambodia their solemn guarantee of non-intervention? The allies had confidence in Austria because they found there politicians of divergent opinions who were, nevertheless, patriots. This example might remind Laotians that other countries would not respect them unless they showed themselves really independent.’2 Then, on Menon’s motion, it was agreed to continue with CoChairmen . Gromyko took the chair, and Home spoke first. ‘He said that we 188 Opening of the Geneva Conference 189 should consider where the 1954 Agreements went wrong and try to improve on them. Our goal was an unaligned, independent and peaceful Laos.’ The main elements of an agreement would be ‘that Laos should be united with no armies or special groups setting themselves up against the law; that its genuine neutrality must be established, a first requirement being a pledge of neutrality by the Laotian Government and reciprocal pledges by other countries to respect it; that it must be agreed with the Laotian Government what their military requirement would be and some control system must be devised to see that these requirements were not exceeded; that arrangements should be made so that economic aid did not become a political instrument or a source of international rivalry; and that the powers and responsibilities of the International Commission should be re-examined.’3 Chen Yi insisted on speaking on the opening day, creating, according to Arthur Lall, the Indian representative, an impression of confidence, strength and sureness of purpose. He placed the US ‘in clear confrontation with his country’, making 17 references to it, ‘mostly highly critical’,4 a ‘disagreeable’ speech, as the British delegation put it, blaming the Americans for ‘everything in Laos’ and demanding the cessation of foreign interference and the dissolution of SEATO.5 Next day the South Vietnamese appeared, but not the Thais nor the RLG. Rusk spoke of lapses in the ceasefire, and then turned to the problem of ensuring ‘a genuinely neutral Laos’. Mere non-alignment was not enough, given the ‘modern modes by which one government may subtly impose its will upon another’. He saw no difficulty in removing American instructors and stopping supplies if ‘the Viet Minh brethren’ and others from the north returned home. The US had no interest in Laos as a base or in making it a staging area or a thoroughfare for subversive agents, and if others could make the same commitment and support international machinery to protect Laos against such activities, ‘we shall have taken an important step towards peace in South-East Asia’.The machinery must have access to all parts of the country without the need for the consent of any officials, national or local, have its own transport and communication equipment, and be able to act on complaints from any responsible sources. The control body must proceed by majority rule, with the right to file majority and minority reports, and not be paralysed by a veto. Economic aid could best be channelled...