To Nation by Revolution: Indonesia in the 20th Century

Chapter 4. Chains of Silver, Chains of Steel: Forcing Politics on Geography

84 To Nation by Revolution 84 CHAPTER 4 Chains of Silver, Chains of Steel: Forcing Politics on Geography Batavia rose to prominence in the archipelago in the period 1650–1750 in the same way as earlier centres since Sriwijaya — with symbolic political primacy following commercial dominance. Since 1800, however, Batavia/ Jakarta has had to fight an uphill battle against market economic forces in order to counter the influence of Singapore and Penang. The Netherlands Indies government gradually achieved economic control in Sumatra, Kalimantan and East Indonesia by a mixture of brute force, strategic concessions to Straits-based trade and foreign investment, and support for national institutions such as the KPM shipping line. The institutional basis of this forcing of trade to fit political boundaries largely collapsed in the 1940s and the Republic has subsequently had a sequence of uphill battles to reconstruct a similar policy. Introduction Although Sukarno claimed that “a child” could see the natural unity of Indonesia by looking at a map; the construction of its boundaries has cost a great deal of blood over the past two centuries. The Malacca Straits are the greatest artery of commerce passing through Southeast Asia, but also a highway linking the Malay-speaking peoples around it. Its best natural ports are situated on the Malaysian side. Constructing two mutually exclusive political units, one including all of Sumatra and Java and the other the ports of Malaya, was bound to be a task akin to pushing rocks uphill. In our own time, the map-fixed frontiers of late colonialism are at last becoming less oppressive. The aspiration towards two growth Chains of Silver, Chains of Steel 85 triangles centring on Singapore and Penang respectively, and attempting to transcend national boundaries in the context of both ASEAN solidarity and economic globalisation,1 is a sign that the problems created in 1824 are being resolved at last. Background: Political Status Follows Trade The nexus between economic and political power was close to the surface in the Indonesian archipelago. The emperors of China, Delhi or Byzantium might have spurned commerce as unworthy of the attention of rulers, but not so the rajas below the winds. As Wolters puts it: “The conviction everywhere in this cultural zone was that busy harbours brought power and brilliance to the local ruler”, so that this was the first priority of the ambitious.2 Milner examines 19th-century Malay texts for his conclusion that the Malay elite “sought wealth not for its own sake but as a means of gaining political influence in the form of a sizeable personal following”.3 Some recent writing may have suggested that in Bali, central Java and Luwu (Sulawesi) rulers sought more theatrical means to establish their power. But such constructions should be read into an earlier past only with caution. Viewing Java from the outside (admittedly at an unusually turbulent period), one of the first and most acute European observers, Tome Pires, noted in 1515 that the coastal kings, at least, “were not Javanese of long standing”, but foreign merchants who had prospered in Java, “made themselves masters of the sea coast and took over trade and power in Java”.4 Military and cultural prowess was not unimportant. Wars were constantly fought for control of people, regalia, strategic sites and trade routes. But these were usually between rival centres of commerce and power, not between a hinterland and a metropolis. Between minor ports and major ones, upstream populations and the downstream port-capital, stateless and migratory peoples and an urban trade centre, there was more often acceptance of a necessary symbiotic relation. Some form of tribute to such centres was part of the process of communicating with the outside world. Vital necessities such as salt, dried fish, iron weapons and tools, bronze artefacts, Chinese ceramics and Indian cloth entered through these centres. Hinterland populations brought their forest, marine and agricultural produce to exchange in them against the imported and manufactured goods, and accepted that part of that transaction was to render some of their trade goods to the king and his officials as tribute: the 86 To Nation by Revolution price of trading in their port. In turn, the port-ruler was almost invariably involved in a similar relationship with a bigger commercial centre elsewhere , in Sriwijaya, Majapahit, Melaka, Aceh, Makasar or Siam, and ultimately in China. Most of the major Southeast Asian trade centres were close enough...