Southern West Cameroon Revisited (1950-1972) Volume One: Unveiling Inescapable Traps

Chapter 8 - Indictments: Foncha Opposed Southern Cameroons Independence

199 Chapter 8 Indictments: Foncha Opposed Southern Cameroons Independence Brash Unsubstantiated Accusations Of the litany of accusations piled up against Foncha, two stick out poignantly. One is with regard to his policy towards autonomy or independence for Southern Cameroons and the other about secret deals he is supposed to have struck with President Ahmadou Ahidjo in 1961 over positions for himself and Muna in Ahidjo’s Government. In fact, there are repeated instances in the Summit Magazine interview where Professor Ngoh is absolute on the fact that: “Foncha was not really in favour of Southern Cameroons attaining independence as a separate state”.300 As if this is not sufficiently absurd considering the overwhelming revelations now available in the declassified British secret papers which bear overwhelming testimony to the invidious role the officials of the Colonial and Foreign Offices played to obstruct any attempts towards securing independence for Southern Cameroons by Foncha. Further reference is made in the interview to an obscure, possibly inconsequential discussion Foncha is supposed to have had with Mr. Eastwood of the Colonial Office in March 1956, to substantiate the accusation. However, when placed in context, this was when the KNDP was barely one year old and five tedious political years away from the actual battle for reunification and independence which only gathered pace during the period 1958-1961. Although Professor Ngoh’s word alone is taken on its own authority, it would have been more credible to situate the “circumstance” in which such a conversation took place to accord it such prominence. It is an acknowledged fact that a week in politics is a long time as any of a number of events could have happened to necessitate a change of attitude, if indeed this were to have been the case. That is why such an important indictment ought to have been 300 See Epilogue 200 concretely contextualized. Furthermore, on the balance, if such meticulous attention could be given to Foncha, who at the time was only the leader of the KNDP which was the opposition party, this assertion could also have been considered in comparative terms for example, how often Dr. Endeley, Leader of Government Business and Foncha’s direct political opponent changed his mind on the same crucial political issue during that same period. In fact, it deserves in this instance, to emphasize that it was precisely Endeley’s complete volte face from reunification with French Cameroon to integration with Nigeria that forced Foncha and Jua out of the KNC to form the KNDP. It was certainly “hitting below the belt” to single out Foncha for attack on such a subject and even worse, quoting the same British Colonial Office source; comprising people who, as has been demonstrated, placed every conceivable hurdle on Foncha’s path against achieving the goal of independence for Southern Cameroons through the “Third Question”, which they blocked.301 These revelations in point of fact constitute the totality of the subject matter of the correspondence: to “Stop Foncha” from pursuing the famous “Third Question” of independence for Southern Cameroons in the anticipated plebiscite.302 However, what is available on record about Mr. Christopher Eastwood’s attitude to Foncha’s bid for independence is exactly the opposite of that referred to above. With reference to a pertinent minute from Mr. Eastwood, the following action was taken on the specific issue of independence for Southern Cameroons. This rejoinder was made apparently after the botched Tripartite Conference held at Buea in mid-May 1961 at which Foncha and Ahidjo were locked up in a bitter deadlock. Both men openly disagreed on the floor of the conference over the issue of defence, the deployment of Republican Forces in Southern Cameroons and Ahidjo’s demand for greater powers to be conferred on him during the intervening period between independence and the application of the Federal Constitution. Note was taken in response to Eastwood that: 301 The declassified British secret papers Appendix 2. 302 Ibid., Appendix.. 201 Foncha might go to the UN asking not for extension of Trusteeship at all but for Independence, possibly within the commonwealth. He would argue that it was not possible to agree terms for gaining independence by joining the Republic in accordance with the Assembly’s resolution…. Independence for Southern Cameroons would face us with considerable problems…. In short, this is not a course which we should at all encourage Foncha to adopt. … The departments are strongly of...