A Scriptural Sculpture of Knowledges

Chapter 4 - Science and Knowing

103 Chapter 4 Science and Knowing 4.1. Memory and Scientific Theory Animals and humans have only two main mechanisms for adapting to their environment, the first one is biological evolution and the second one is learning (Kandel and Mack, 2003:273).In matters of learning, it is important to note that scientific reasoning differs from heuristics. Nonetheless in relation to the case of the revolution in geology, Solomon (1992:452) argues that whereas heuristics reasoning, brought about the division of cognitive labour which in turn contribute to scientific success, these very heuristics may also lead us inadequately, causing us to invest too much time in hopeless theories. But in a language which seems to deny their permanence, theories are usually presented in academia as a permanent snapshot of what the contingent world is or was. The genesis of that presentation in the mind assures the continuity of their relevancy throughout the existence of subjects both as a form of memory and script for social performances. An outdated theory no matter its irrelevancy is not excluded from the legacy of knowledges in academia and its capacity to create reality is not neutralized. Yet for Livingstone (2003:4) scientific theories do not spread uniformly from its point of discovery. According to him in the process of their circulation, they are modified and transformed. As a result, he notes that the meaning of scientific theories is not stable; rather it is mobile and varies from place to place. In this regard the objectives of this 104 chapter are twofold. Firstly I will highlight both the agency and the cognition of the built forms of the laboratory in section 4.2. Secondly I will investigate how scientific reasoning operates in its encounters of new knowledge and distinct ways of knowing from place to place in section 4.3. 4.2. Cognition of the Physical Space of the Lab Nola (2010:266) argues that by virtue of being a descriptive activity rather than an explanatory, the ethnomethodology at the core of the social studies of science has led to: “a spate of studies, now subsiding, in which the activities of scientists, along with their notes recorded conversations, gossip, and the like, are viewed with the eye of an anthropologist visiting a strange tribe.” While the representational and subjective aspect of ethnography has been often criticized, Rooke and Clark (2005:564) point out those interpretive practices are central to all sciences. According to them, ethnographic studies of science have amply demonstrated the interpretive practices taking place in the laboratories. Still Garforth (2011:3) notes that by paying attention only on what can be seen, most approaches on social studies of science miss to acknowledge the importance of solitary thinking work. In this regards, he notes that: …lab study genre has tended to rely on the rhetorical authority of witnessing and revelation, rather than exploring the discursively and materially situated gaze and “partial vision” (Haraway, 1991, 1997) of the ethnographer as part of the reflexive methodology. Lab studies have tended to treat being there as straightforward outcome of “penetration these black boxes,” the scientific 105 laboratories (Latour 1983, 141). But being there, as Geertz reminds us (1988), is a textual construction, not a simple matter of fact. Appeal to being there are no guarantee of seeing there, and indeed may gloss the interactional and epistemic dynamics of doing observation (Garforth, 2011:12) Garforth’s argument is insightful to the extent that one defines “being solitary” as being without companions or merely out of the reach of a physical space. In contrast I think that inside the physical space of the laboratory the scientist is never alone. Because as Hillier (2008:228) puts it the physical space (built environment) has social behaviours resting on laws which in turn are informed by particular social values. According to Him, by the means of these very laws, the physical space is not only impacting on human affairs when manipulated, but do retain a form of agency. It follows then that the physical space of the laboratory is a repository of social values which might filter in its own right the information we cognitively code or retrieve. In other words, “society is hiding behind the fetish of technique” as Latour (1994:53) argues. Though it is important to emphasize that the society hiding itself behind technological artefacts (ex:physical space of the laboratory) might not always correspond to the...