Democracy and Human Rights in Africa: The Politics of Collective Participation and Governance in Cameroon

Chapter 2 - Confusion, Manipulation, and the Invisible Hand of Federalism in Africa: Lessons in Patriotism, Sincerity, and Brotherhood in Cameroon

51 Chapter 2 Confusion, Manipulation, and the Invisible Hand of Federalism in Africa: Lessons in Patriotism, Sincerity, and Brotherhood in Cameroon For 34 years in some of the highest offices in this land, 13 [now 31] at the helm of state, and for all the experience usually – and often wrongly – associated with longevity of service, for all his claim to patriotism for his people, Mr. Biya’s dreams and aspirations for his people, his most precious gift to them, have been summarised in the 60 articles of the draft constitution tabled before parliament last week [which, of course, became the 69-article 1996 Constitution barely one month later]. [Fohtung, 1995] On The Invisible Hand of Federalism Trager (1968: x) has posed some important questions that, inter alia, would help in deciphering the invisible hand of federalism. What is federalism, and why do federations form and fail? In other words, what are the prerequisites, if any, for a successful federation? Can one discern factors that make for success or failure? What role, for example, is played by the constitution itself, its formula for dividing power between the centre and the units? What relative importance should be attached to the non constitutional factors? Most of these issues have already been touched in the previous Chapter; this Chapter being devoted mostly to the forces pushing for and against federalism. There are some six factors that almost every writer on federalism has cited as being responsible for entities federating. These factors, constituting the bases of successful federations as set out by Wheare (1963) and cited by Southall (1974: 138) and Eleazu (1977: 17) are: A sense of military insecurity and the consequent need for common defence, a desire to be independent of foreign powers, and a realization that only through union could independence be secured; a hope of economic advantage from union; some political association of the 52 communities concerned prior to their federal union; geographical neighbourhood; and similarity of political institutions…. How many of these factors (if any) do apply to Cameroon’s experience? Stevenson (1989: 13) has opined that it may be that no single factor can explain every instance of the formation of a federal union, and even in a particular case, as the Cameroonian here, a variety of factors may contribute. A critically balanced analysis of the FRC and other current proposals for federalism provides ample evidence that both the West and East Cameroonian political elites involved used the 1961 Foumban Conference merely as a means to something else and not for the sake of what federalism is usually adopted to achieve: special human rights protection. Thus, the invisible hand of federalism in Cameroon would come nowhere near those of other federations, explaining in part or in full what Fossungu (2013) sees as its funny multiculturalism and definition of culture that does not encapsulate history. It also explicates the insecurity (rather than security) that the people were dragged into. Federating For Security? The search or desire for security has certainly also played an enormous role in the formation of many great federations. H.W. Springer, according to Stevenson (1989: 13), has categorized all the security factors into two main groups of “predisposing conditions” and “inducements”. Discussing R.D. Dikshit’s The Political Geography of Federalism (1975), Stevenson (1989: 13) points out that he has instead distinguished factors leading to union from those leading to the retention of some degree of regional autonomy; indicating that a preponderance of the first will lead to the formation of a unitary state, while a preponderance of the second will prevent any union from taking place. Only a balance between the two will lead to federalism and only if the balance is maintained. On the other hand, Trager (1968: xiv) has summarized everything and come out with two compelling forces pushing for federalism, namely, (1) affording the necessary force for aggregating territory, and (2) readiness against some impending militarydiplomatic threat or opportunity. This factor would explain why the Canadian Fathers of Confederation indicated that they were federating in order to escape “our impending misfortune” (Newman, 1968: 299; Hogg, 53 1996: 100-101). It is thus very important that all of the federating entities perceive the problem; otherwise, there is a problem. Security will thus not be a credible factor if some of the entities are not feeling insecure. This is clearly seen in the Caribbean Federation which de Smith (1964: 280) says hinged...