The Cameroon-Nigeria Border Dispute. Management and Resolution, 1981-2011: Management and Resolution, 1981-2011

Chapter 5 - The Process of the Implementation of the International Court of Justice Verdict, 2002-2011

117 Chapter 5 The Process of the Implementation of the International Court of Justice Verdict, 2002-2011 The verdict of the ICJ on the Cameroon–Nigeria border dispute case delivered on October 10, 2002 requested both countries to withdraw their administration and military or police from the areas they occupy which fall within the sovereignty of the other, immediately and unconditionally. The Court equally delimited the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary from Lake Chad through the Land and Maritime Boundary which had to be demarcated. Unlike national courts which rely on its officers to execute or enforce its judgements, it is the UN Security Council which has the right (but not obliged) to make recommendations or take measures to implement the judgement of the Court especially if one of the parties fails to obey it. In the Cameroon-Nigeria border dispute case, the good offices of the UN Secretary General were primordial in the implementation of the verdict. Complementing Legality with UN Brokered Diplomacy Cameroon and Nigeria committed themselves to respect the outcome of the verdict in conformity with the jurisdiction of the Court which spells out that “states may commit themselves in advance to accept the jurisdiction of the Court, either by signing a treaty or convention which provides for referral to the Court or by making a declaration to that effect.”71 On that score, the UN Secretary General used his good offices to convene a pre-verdict meeting of the Heads of State of Cameroon and Nigeria in September 2002. 1. Basic Facts About the United Nations, p. 16. 118 The Paris Tripartite Meeting, September 2002 On September 5, 2002, Presidents Paul Biya of Cameroon and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria met in the Parisian outskirts of Saint Cloud at the invitation of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. The meeting took place in the presence of French President, Jacques Chirac. The two Presidents agreed to respect whatever verdict the ICJ would pass. They also opted for confidence building measures and initiatives that favour the demilitarization of the disputed areas with the possibility of involving international observers to follow the withdrawal of all troops. With these engagements and commitments, Nigeria and Cameroon had the moral obligation to obey the Court’s judgement. In spite of these assurances, the Court’s verdict was received in Cameroon with great joy and with mixed feelings in Nigeria. While Abuja was asking for time to digest the verdict, Yaounde issued an official statement on the morrow of the verdict making commitments to reinforce the friendly ties between the two countries, and promising hospitality for the millions of Nigerians living in Cameroon. As the Federal government of Nigeria was studying the verdict, pressure was being mounted on her to reject it. Cross River State Governor, Donald Duke, and the Senator of the South-South Senatorial District under which Bakassi was said to fall, Princess Florence Ita-Giwa, was some of the prominent figures who openly rejected the verdict. The Nigerian Senate even threatened to impeach President Obasanjo if he accepted the verdict.72 After a Federal government meeting on the ICJ verdict, an official statement was issued on October 23, 2002 and signed by the Minister of Transport, Ojo Madueke, which was more or less a rejection of the verdict.73 It was against this backdrop that the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan used his good offices to convene the first post verdict 2. Aji James, “The Dynamics of Cameroon-Nigeria Relations”, p. 58. 3. Ibid., p. 59. 119 meeting of the Heads of State of Cameroon and Nigeria in Geneva, Switzerland on November 15, 2002 to chart a way forward. The Geneva I Tripartite Meeting, November 2002 The Geneva I Tripartite Meeting of Biya, Annan and Obasanjo came out with what was termed the “Joint Geneva Communiqué” in which the two Presidents renewed their commitment to renounce the use of force in their bilateral engagements and to look for peaceful means to solve frontier differences. They also defined proper measures to reinforce confidence building and requested the UN Secretary General to put in place a Mixed Bilateral Commission presided over by his personal representative and charged with reflecting on ways of implementing the ICJ verdict. After this tripartite meeting code-named Geneva I, the Nigerian President, Obasanjo, declared to the press that Nigeria has never accepted nor rejected the ICJ judgement. This wavering attitude of Obasanjo was conditioned by Nigeria’s internal...