The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa: State and civil society in Cameroon

2. The Introduction of Neoliberal Economic and Political Reforms in the Cameroonian Post-colonial State

21 2 The introduction of neoliberal economic and political reforms in the Cameroonian post-colonial state Introduction For a long time Cameroon was lauded by many observers, including World Bank staff, as one of the most prosperous and most stable countries in post-colonial Africa. Following the unprecedented economic and political crisis in the 1980s, this rosy assessment has been replaced by gloom. After some initial hesitation, the Cameroonian government could not escape during the deteriorating economic situation from calling upon the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for the implementation of a structural adjustment programme (SAP). It was soon required to conform to the new standards of these financial institutions, linking structural adjustment to democratisation. So, in addition to the economic conditionality that plagued African states during much of the 1980s, it was also obliged to accept ‘political conditionality’. The IMF and World Bank are, in fact, the spearheads of the neoliberal project that has become the hegemonic ideological project of our time following the collapse of the socialist-oriented states in Eastern Europe. The major tenets of neoliberalism are: (a) the belief that rolling the state back and liberalising the economy will induce economic development, and (b) the belief that there is an intrinsic connection between capitalism and democracy. Democracy is thought to enhance the prospects for economic development, while economic liberalisation is thought to enhance the prospects for democracy (Beckman 1993: 20-33; Jeffries 1993: 20-35; Mkandawire 1994: 155-173). Several World Bank reports have been signaling a major shift in the Western donors’ perspectives, from a preference for technocratic-authoritarian regimes to an endorsement of 22 The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa democratic government. Democracy is said to be capable of legitimising the imperatives of adjustment. It can also improve governance and state capacity to implement the austere adjustment measures. These reports, however, equally stress that sustainable democracy cannot be achieved without the empowerment of civil society. Like elsewhere in the world, the SAP imposed upon Cameroon by the IMF and the World Bank has involved the application of a standard package of measures to stabilise the domestic economy, to minimalise state intervention in the economy, and to give the market a freer hand in the allocation of resources. These measures include reduction of public expenditure, removal of public subsidies, dismantlement of public sector, privatisation and promotion of private enterprise (both national and foreign), trade liberalisation, producer prices reforms, devaluation, restructuring of state institutions, and legal reforms aimed at supplying an enabling environment. It is beyond dispute that the SAP has yielded some results in Cameroon: the labour and investment codes have been liberalised, several price controls have been abolished, many import and export duties have been reduced, the commercialisation of export crops has been liberalised by withdrawing the bying monopoly of the cooperatives, restricting the activities of the National Produce Marketing Board to quality control, and allying local to world market prices, and, in 1994, the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc has been drastically devalued. What is most striking in the Cameroonian situation, however, is that most of these results in economic liberalisation have been accomplished after initial government opposition. There is, in fact, ample evidence to demonstrate that the Cameroonian government has constantly attempted to undermine the economic and political reforms advocated by the western donors and international financial institutions. As a result, the process of economic liberalisation has been slow and inconsistent. The necessary institutional reform in the public and parastatal sectors, for example, has been largely thwarted by government delaying tactics and half-hearted implementation. This is particularly grave as the reform of these sectors marked by excessive costs and inefficiencies has been a cornerstone of the SAP. Political 23 Chapter 2: The introduction of neoliberal economic and political reforms in Cameroon liberalisation has hardly gone beyond the introduction of a multiparty system and a larger measure of press freedom. The government’s weak commitment and limited implementation has led to protracted conflicts with the western donors and international financial institutions, sometimes followed by suspension of financial aid. It will be argued in this chapter that the government’s persistent opposition to the neoliberal economic and political reforms can be explained by the class character of the Cameroonian post-colonial state. In his seminal book on Cameroonian politics, Bayart (1979) has claimed that the first President of Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo, was instrumental in creating a highly...