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69 11 Is There Really an Anglophone Problem in Cameroon?1 I f there is an “Anglophone problem’’ in this country, what exactly is the problem? If there is no Anglophone problem, then what the hell is the problem with Anglophones? What are they always complaining about? So whichever way you look at it, there is a problem even if it turns out to be the problem of assuming wrongly that there is a problem where there is none. Now, is there one problem or a catalogue of problems? It would be unwise to assume that there is only one single underlying problem as it would be to assume that there is a plethora of unrelated problems. Only careful observation, description, analysis and reflection can clarify the issue. A people’s identity is very much tied to their history. If we throw a historical bird’s eye view on our recent history we can see that we have evolved within the last 30 years from “The Bilingual United Republic of Cameroon’’ to “The Republic of Cameroon.” The sign-posts along that historical path include the Foumban Constitutional Conference (1960), Referendum and Reunification (1961), Single Party Rule (1966), Unitary State (1972), New Deal Regime (1982), Return to Multiparty Politics (1990). Whatever positive elements there may be in this evolution, it is incontrovertible that today many Anglophones feel like a conquered people. Evidence of a completely abandoned area strikes one from Kumba through Mamfe to Nkambe, a journey that, in colonial days, could be done in three days but which today cannot be done in six days without a lot of good luck. What has happened, generally, I believe, is that, beginning with the Foumban Conference, Anglophones have gradually lost their bargaining power, as an identifiable group of people with a common history/destiny, shared values, aims, objectives and way of thinking. This loss of bargaining power is directly connected with the lack of a credible leadership, exacerbated by the inability or failure of the rank and file to stand up for their rights or take their destiny firmly in hand. 70 Road Companion to Democracy and Meritocracy I shall try to illustrate the above claims with examples. All the examples I shall use are true stories although they may not be entirely free from apocryphal elements. Those referred to in these stories, who are very well known and who know themselves equally well, are encouraged to respond to these stories so as to confirm or disconfirm the apocryphal elements, if any. The primary school teachers turned politicians who led Anglophones into Reunification were conceptually ill-equipped to negotiate fair terms for the union. No one should blame them, as it was a matter of invincible ignorance. There is no doubt that the overwhelming choice of reunification at the 1961 referendum was a consciously genuine, fair and right choice on the part of the Anglophone masses, out of the choices presented I believe that, if the referendum were reconducted today, with the same options, the outcome would be the same. Those who think that the “Anglophone problem” is a problem of secession are completely mistaken. Those who talk about “Ambazonia” are an eccentric minority. Not that their case lacks coherence, but rather that, up till now, there has really been nothing of sufficient gravity to make it generally persuasive. The problems that there are have been mainly procedural problems which should have been squarely addressed and solved or resolved progressively as and when they arose in the light of practical experience and a better conceptual grasp of the situation. The Foumban agreement, for instance, in spite of having been a raw deal for Anglophones, was a deal all the same. Now, instead of correcting the situation as and when the opportunities came, Anglophones allowed it to degenerate from a raw-deal into a nodeal situation. The Foumban deal, for example, did provide for biculturalism , bilingualism, relative autonomy and juridic equality such as in the provision that the President and Vice President of the Republic could not come from one and the same federated state. But by 1972, all these guarantees, in spite of the efforts of people like Augustine Jua and Bernard Fonlon, had been unilaterally abrogated in actual practice. If Dr. Foncha’s dramatic resignation had occurred about that time, things might have been salvaged. Unfortunately, it came two decades too late. And let no one put all the blame on Foncha. All other Anglophones in positions of power/ [18.118...

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