Minority Education in China: Balancing Unity and Diversity in an Era of Critical Pluralism

Notes

Introduction 1. One finds a variety of English glosses for Fei’s formulation. In addition to “pluralistic unity,” another common translation is “unity in diversity”; yet other authors prefer “diversity in unity.” There are obvious differences of emphasize here, with some stressing the unity side of Fei’s equation while others the diversity side. Fei Xiaotong remained fairly neutral in the English translation of his Tanner Lecture at the University of Hong Kong, where he first publically introduced the phrase in 1988. Here he rendered the expression Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju (中華民族多 元一體格局) as “plurality and unity in the configuration of the Chinese people,” or “pluralistic yet unified configuration of the Chinese people.” Yet, a revised 2003 edition published in Chinese by the Central Minzu University Press added the following English title: “The pattern of diversity in unity of the Chinese nation.” To avoid foreclosing different interpretations, we have decided against imposing a uniform gloss for the phrase, allowing individual authors to provide their own. Chapter 2 The Power of Chinese Linguistic Imperialism and Its Challenge to Multicultural Education 1. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Robert Phillipson, Tove SkutnabbKangas , James Leibold, and Chen Yangbin for their valuable suggestions and criticism ,andtheparticipantsfortheircriticalcommentsatthe“MulticulturalEducation and the Challenge to Chinese National Integration” conference, December 2–3, 2010, La Trobe University, and at a School of International and Political Studies seminar, Deakin University, in April 2011. Special thanks go to Kingsley Edney for his research assistance. 2. See the interesting article about how one should refer to this language. Zhang Wenmu advocated “Chinese language” (Zhongguoyu 中國語) at http://www. danwei.org/language/chinas. Notes 3. See “Tibetan Students in China Protest over Language Policy,” BBC News, October 20, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11581189, accessed on November 5, 2010. 4. See http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?articletype=flash&id=2007&rmenuid=m orenews&tab=1, accessed on May 30, 2011. 5. See “Uyghur Language Under Attack: The Myth of “Bilingual” Education in the People’s Republic of China,” http://uhrp.org/docs/UyghurLanguageUnderAttack. pdf, accessed on 11 November 2012; and “UAA concerned by top Chinese official’s commentsonlanguagepolicyinEastTurkestan,”http://uhrp.org/articles/2232/1/ UAA-concerned-by-top-Chinese-officials-comments-on-language-policy-in-EastTurkestan -/index.html, accessed on November 11, 2012. 6. Ma made such a remark during a workshop at La Trobe University, Australia, December 2–3, 2010. 7. I would like to thank James Leibold for this point. Leibold (2007) has discussed the work of C. Pat Giersch, John Herman, Donald Sutton, William Rowe and others working on the late imperial frontier in the South. 8. See http://www.xxz.gov.cn/goxx/situation.php?id=13, accessed on November 11, 2012. 9. See http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20050301/index.htm, accessed on November 11, 2012. 10. Of course, one can argue that the primary reason for adopting simplified Hanzi was the proliferation and universalization of basic education. 11. We need to investigate this further. To what extend did Hanzi become the lingua franca of commerce in premodern China, like what Malay did in Southeast Asia? What role did premodern markets play in spreading the Han script? 12. Ma made such a remark at a workshop at La Trobe University, Australia, December 2–3, 2010. 13. See chapters by Linda Tsung, Zuliyati Simayi, and Zhao Zhenzhou in this volume. Chapter 3 How Do You Say “China” in Mongolian? 1. I met and argued with them on many occasions since I came back to China from the USA in 2008. 2. This line of argument is well developed by Pan Jiao (2003), Chen Jianyue (2004), Wang Xien (2009), Du Yonghao (2009), and Zhang Haiyang (2011). 3. See V. I. Lenin, “Kriticheskie zametki po national’nomu voprosu,” as cited in Slezkine (1996: 205). 4. Since September 1933, the Red Army was time and again in danger of being wiped out by the Guomindang or Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek and had to launch the so-called Long March in October 1934. As a result, they sought to unite all sectors and gather support in all directions, including that from the minorities, as an urgent priority. Though the discourse of class was dominant, Han cultural pride 342 Notes to pages 46–68 and Han centrism never disappeared. As later developments prove, the temporary concession given to minorities only served to assimilate them when...