The Public Sector in Hong Kong

12. The Public Sector and Its Future

12 The Public Sector and Its Future It is not easy to govern Hong Kong. Aside from the overarching problem of the relationship between the government and its people, there are many specific constitutional, organisational and policy issues which affect the way in which the public sector works. The Basic Law does not function in accordance with its central precept: the executive cannot “lead” and provide “strong governance” because it is constrained by a civil society which is often less than convinced that the government is acting in its best interests. Relationships between the executive and the legislature have still not been sufficiently delineated. There is no majority government party and no certainty that government proposals will be accepted. The civil service maintains its high administrative capacity but it suffers from some structural and human resource management weaknesses and low policy capacity. The public sector beyond the civil service is not properly accountable and does not always work in harmony with the government. There are major problems in formulating and implementing new policies because of frequent trenchant opposition from civil society groups and the legislature. And above all this the polity is polarised between those who support the existing order and those who want to see a rapid transition to a more democratic system. Under such circumstances, to provide responsible government is a daunting task, especially if external challenges, over which the government has little control, require urgent action. In this concluding chapter, we revisit those issues, seeking to understand how the present problems arose and looking to the future to see how they might be resolved. The Problems of the Transition An important feature of colonial administration was that the principal institutions — the Governor, the Executive Council, the Legislative Council, the Judiciary and the Civil Service — were very closely integrated. The fusion of administrative and political functions, the absence of direct control from London, and public acceptance of the bureaucratic order resulted in a centralised, autonomous system that restricted political participation but still managed to maintain stability and promote economic growth. It was a system that held some attraction for the Chinese government. By the 290 The Public Sector in Hong Kong time negotiations were completed on the future of the territory, it seemed possible that, although there might be a change of sovereignty, the system would remain intact. On the Chinese side, the concept of “one country, two systems” gave recognition not only to the importance of capitalism but also to the political, administrative and legal supports that made it possible. On the British side, there was a clear intention to leave a legacy of freedom without democracy, executive government without the embarrassment of too many legislative controls, and the continuing dominance of an efficient civil service. The Chinese government proved quite willing to write such provisions in very general terms into the Basic Law. The existing political and administrative arrangements had the backing of the business community and pro-China groups and, with the exception of some vague concessions to future democratic development, the political framework strongly resembled the pre-1997 colonial constitution. There were three problems. The first was that the population became increasingly politicised as a result of the Sino-British agreement and the Tiananmen Square massacre, and began to demand more representative government and more protection of their civil liberties. Just before the retrocession in 1997, Patten observed that whenever there was a fair test of public opinion “approaching two-thirds of the electorate support a democratic agenda.”1 It may be, as some scholars have argued, that there was uncertainty about the kind of system that might be introduced, the niceties of different types of democratic political order, or the degree to which constitutional development should take priority over the pressing problems of the economy, unemployment and housing.2 But that was perhaps less important than the fact that every poll showed that a majority were not happy with the existing political system and that they had declining levels of trust in their government.3 The changes to protect civil liberties and expand the franchise introduced by the colonial administration towards the end of the transitional period were responses to that dissatisfaction. And, although the electoral reforms did not survive the handover, and the measures designed to protect civil liberties were seen to be fragile, they created expectations of progress towards a system that was more representative. When the incoming government dissolved the Legislative Council on 1 July 1997 and subsequently introduced an...