Governors, Politics and The Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918?8

11: Conclusions

11 Conclusions There was no clear linear progression in the development of the Hong Kong government’s autonomy. There were too many variables for this to have happened. There were moments when it was able to exercise a degree, even a high degree of autonomy, and others when it was not. Much depended on the circumstances of the time, the political pressure that was brought to bear and how those in authority responded to it. The exercise of autonomy was as much the result of changing political pressures as it was of the personalities and the beliefs of the principal actors involved, in Britain as well as Hong Kong, and their willingness and determination to act upon them. Carpenter sets out a clear exposition of the conditions necessary for government agencies to develop autonomy in a democratic political system. The Hong Kong government, however, was not democratically elected but was answerable to a British government that was and, in addition, it had to take account of local political opinion reflected by the unofficials. Nor was it, like the United States government agencies Carpenter studied, competing with other government agencies for power or resources. This concluding chapter will consider, therefore, what issues and factors, including those set out by Carpenter, were relevant to the development of the Hong Kong government’s autonomy in this somewhat different milieu. Firstly, however, this chapter will examine whether Hong Kong’s constitutional subservience to the British Crown had a major impact on the development of its ability to exercise autonomy. Hong Kong’s colonial relationship with Britain Hong Kong’s relationship with Britain provides only a limited context to understanding the changing power relationship between the two governments . Constitutional subordination provided the institutional framework within which the British government established a comprehensive 218 Governors, Politics and the Colonial Office series of reporting requirements and approvals. The formal appointment of the Governor, senior civil servants and unofficials by the Secretary of State on behalf of the Crown all provided an opportunity for Britain to exercise power over the colonial government. The workings of this relationship, within the rubric of colonial regulations, provided a framework within which political power could be exercised. In practice, however, politics was the principal determinant of the balance of political power between the two governments. In some cases, it was politics in Britain that enabled the home government to prevail, as in the case of mui tsai; in others, it was local politics that enabled the Hong Kong government to determine the outcome, as in the case of the proposed municipal council. In others, the outcome was the result of more nuanced forces. The directive on housing, for example, was a consequence of the interplay of political forces in both places. This relationship, therefore, provided the context but not the driving force behind the nature and development of the power relationship between the British and Hong Kong governments. Whose policies prevailed? It is remarkable how few policies examined originated from the Hong Kong government: indeed, nearly all originated from elsewhere. The policy to regulate mui tsai was dictated by Churchill and Passfield to an unwilling Hong Kong government; the local government’s preference was not to interfere. In 1946, Young was similarly told that he had to consult and plan for constitutional reform. The Secretary of State also instructed a not unwilling Governor to establish a Housing Authority and Hong Kong was given little option but to pay a defence contribution . Nor was it just from the sovereign power that policies emanated. The Hong Kong government under Stubbs and Clementi was strongly influenced by Chinese elite pressure over mui tsai. It was unofficial opposition, initially to the Young Plan and then eventually to any constitutional reform, which pushed Grantham to abandon constitutional change. More positively, one Urban Council unofficial, in the absence of direction from the Hong Kong government, took the lead in the early development of a permanent squatter resettlement policy. The British government, in the form of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and his senior Colonial Office officials did not seek to “control” the Hong Kong government. It was expected to conduct its business in accordance with a set of common values tacitly understood by politicians and officials on both sides. Colonial Office officials tended to act more as supervisors and gave much credence to the views of the “man Conclusions 219 on the spot”. The...