Asian Voices in English

Comments on Professor Harris' paper

ENGLISH VERSUS ISLAM COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR HARRIS' PAPER Christopher New Professor Harris's refreshingly lucid paper expresses admiration for what he calls Mill's I great principle': the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community . . . is to prevent harm to others. This principle, Professor Harris says, requires us 'to distinguish between behaviour which gives offence and behaviour which causes harm', and holds that it is only the latter which governments may prohibit. I share Professor Harris's admiration, but I think there are aspects of Mill's principle, or Professor Harris' version of it, which need more examination than Professor Harris - justifiably no doubt in the context of his wide-ranging papergives them. 1. The Harm/Offence Distinction Let us consider behaviour which deliberately gives offence. If, when you politely invite me to your forthcoming guitar recital I give symbolic expression to my detestation of your playing by slamming the door in your face, I offend you. If I slam it on your fingers I harm you. Yet in each case there may be unjustified infliction of pain (bruised feelings or bruised fingers), which leads to your playing badly at your recital. So my giving offence would then seem to be also causing harm. This suggests that it is only when giving deliberate unjustified offence does not, or would not for reasonable people, have such dire consequences (i.e. when it is mere offence, merely a matter ofbruised feelings) that governments, according to the principle, have no right to proscribe it. But why are deliberately bruised feelings less important than deliberately bruised fingers? (If you were not going to give a recital, that might be the only harm done to you by my slamming the door on them.) Racial and religious, as well as personal, taunts can give deep and justified offence (mere offence), and it is not immediately clear why governments should never in principle prohibit them. Some would argue that people have a right to be protected from behaviour which gives such offence just as they have a right to be protected from obscene phone calls. Their arguments need to be considered. The example just cited is similar to, but also very dissimilar from, the case of Satanic Verses. It is all the more important therefore that it should be thoroughly scrutinised and distinguished from that case. 97 CHRISTOPHER NEW 2. Responsibility for Violence Professor Harris observes: 'to argue that one whose work provokes a violent reaction is ipso facto responsible for the violence that ensues is to stand logic on its head'. Perhaps it is. But to claim, as he does three sentences later, 'Only people who advocate or themselves resort to violence can be held responsible for violence ' may be thought to knock logic sideways. Suppose Professor Harris had known before, or had very good reason to believe, that his peaceable defence of Rushdie would so provoke a Muslim fundamentalist in his audience that the man (or woman) would lob a grenade into the middle of the auditorium at the end of the paper, killing many innocent and talented people. And suppose Professor Harris had gone ahead with his paper regardless. Could he reasonably claim that, since he had neither advocated nor resorted to violence, he could not be held responsible for the violence at all? I hardly think so. Those who know, or have good reason to believe, their work will provoke a violent reaction have a duty to weigh the value they think their work will have against the harm they think it will cause, even if the immediate agent of that harm is not themselves. Professor Harris's principle ignores this fact, and therefore needs qualification. [I hope that my comments will not be misconstrued as offering any support for those who persecute Salmon Rushdie and call for his death. I regard them as misguided fanatics. But if they are to be freed from their error by argument, it must be by argument that is error-free.] 98 ...