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256 14 interlocking autonomy: manila anD muslim minDanao Steven Rood For more than thirty years there have been a variety of “autonomous govern­ ments” in areas of Mindanao. Over the course of six national administrations, numerous regional administrations, and varying intensities of separatist armed conflict, there is general agreement that “autonomy” has not resolved the issues plaguing Muslim Mindanao. Explanations for such systematic failure must go beyond accusations of bad faith or incompetence. This paper examines the multifaceted incentives faced by factions on both sides — Mindanao Muslims and Manila elites — which shape forms of autonomy in Mindanao and limit their effectiveness in addressing grievances which drive separatist sentiment. It concludes with suggestions for ways forward that might satisfy both sides in the interaction. The current period of armed conflict between Muslims in the Philippines and the central state in Manila has now lasted over thirty­five years. In 1968 two events occurred that stirred rebellion. In the “Jabidah massacre” Muslims who had been recruited into the military in order to invade Sabah were slain by their officers when the operation was shut down (one survived to tell the tale) (Dañguilan and Gloria 2000, pp. 2–23). In the same year, a “Muslim Independence Movement” (MIM) was organized by former Governor of Cotabato Province, Datu Udtog Matalam Interlocking Autonomy: Manila and Muslim Mindanao 257 who was disappointed by his role within Manila­centric politics (Abinales 2000, pp. 140–41, 167–68). The movement acquired an armed component with the founding of the Moro1 National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the early 1970s. Reasons that have been adduced for the length of this confrontation range from the insincerity of the national government in addressing griev­ ances, to the self­interest of the actors (the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the local warlords who profit from the war’s continuance), to divisions within the Muslim community (within and among revolutionary movements, traditional leaders and elected politicians) whose inability to unite hampers the achievement of their goals. One attempt at resolving the conflict has involved instituting “autonomous governments” in areas of Mindanao, with new varieties being instituted in 1977, 1990, and 2001. While decentra­ lization (ranging from increased autonomy for local governments to changing the nature of the Philippine state from a unitary one to a federation) has long been, and continues to be, a feature in discourses about governance in the Philippines, “autonomy” in Mindanao has been a special case — not available to the rest of the Philippines.2 The 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF called for autonomy to be granted to 13 provinces in Mindanao and Palawan. But in the implementation, Ferdinand Marcos, in 1977, used his martial law powers to institute, instead, two autonomous regions (the pre­existing administrative regions IX and XII) in Muslim Mindanao covering 10 provinces,3 with regional legislative assembly elections for the two regions conducted in 1979 and 1982. After the fall of Marcos in 1986, the autonomy arrangement was re­worked under the 1987 Constitution — there was a Regional Consultative Commission, following which Congress passed an Organic Law (Republic Act 6734) and in a 1989 plebiscite, four provinces (Sulu, Tawi­Tawi, Maguindanao, and Lanao del Sur) voted to join an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) that began operations in 1990. Then in the 1996 “Final Peace Agreement” between the government and the MNLF (entitled “Final Agreement on the Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement”), revisions of the Organic Act for the ARMM were mandated, and after the January 2001 overthrow of Joseph (“Erap”) Estrada, the revised version was allowed to become law (Republic Act 9054) by President Gloria Macapagal­Arroyo in mid­2001. In an August 2001 plebiscite the Islamic City of Marawi (in Lanao del Sur) and the province of Basilan (though not its capital, Isabela City) voted to join the ARMM. [3.145.58.169] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 10:51 GMT) 258 Steven Rood table 14.1 outline of autonomy in mindano through the years president Framework “autonomy” Marcos (1967–86) 1976 Tripoli Agreement with MNLF Autonomous Regions 9 and 12 Aquino (1986–92) 1987 Constitution Republic Act 6734 (1989) Autonomous Region in Muslim MIndandao (ARMM) — Sulu, Tawi, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur Ramos (1992–98) 1996 Final Peace Agreement with MNLF Estrada (1998–2001) Arroyo (2001–2010) Republic Act 9054 (2001) added to ARMM — Basilan (except Isabela City); Islamic City of Marawi From the very beginning in 1977, the MNLF branded Marcos’ moves towards two...

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