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11. Malay Muslims and the Thai-Buddhist State: Confrontation, Accommodation and Disengagement
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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11 Malay MusliMs and the thai-Buddhist state: Confrontation, aCCoMModation and disengageMent1 Ernesto H. Braam The Malay Muslims in the deep south of Thailand have a long history of asserting their identity against the assimilating force of a dominant Buddhist worldview. Buddhist Siam and its successor, Thailand, have had significant success in assimilating the wide variety of ethnic groups within its borders, including the Chinese, Lao, Khmer and others, into a form of national Thai identity. The only group that has successfully withstood the assimilation policies is the Malay community in the country’s southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.2 The greater the pressure that was put on to this community to surrender its explicit Malay identity, the more it has searched for — and found — ways to preserve its identity. Historically, relations between the old Kingdom of Patani3 (the past incarnation of the three provinces, parts of Songkhla province and northern Malaysia) and Ayutthaya — later Bangkok4 — regularly led to conflict. Whenever the Burmese attacked the Siamese capital Ayutthaya, Patani 272 Ernesto H. Braam would take advantage of its distraction and wrestle itself free of Siam’s yoke. When the Ayutthaya kings (and sometimes queens) finally managed to push back the invading Burmese armies, they would send punitive expeditions to the South to bring the Malay vassal state back under their control. The Anglo-Siamese agreement of 1909 codified this conflict and left the Malay Muslims in Siam, as it were, on the wrong side of the border, separating them from the Malay community in what is now Malaysia, with which they share language, religion and family ties. For many decades, Malay-Muslims in South Thailand have been discriminated against, and were considered to be khaek (guests or visitors) in Thailand. The height of the application of assimilationist policies towards Malay Muslims is generally agreed to have been during the governments of Prime Minister Phibunsongkhram (1938–44 and 1948–57). This nationalist leader glorified the Thai race, changed the name of the country from Siam to Thailand and left no space for minority identities like the Malay Muslims (and the Chinese).5 Ahost of forceful measures were put into effect. Speaking Malay was forbidden and there was strong pressure to change family names into Thai-sounding names (Gilquin 2005, p. 73). Sarongs were forbidden and Western-style dress, such as long trousers and hats, were compulsory (Forbes 1982, p. 1059). The popular habit of chewing betel and areca nut was banned. A measure that infuriated the Malay Muslims was the abolition of shari’a law regarding marriage, divorce and inheritance, as well as the function of the Islamic judge. The Thai Buddhist legal system replaced the existing Islamic laws. Thanet Aphornsuvan differs from most other scholars in that he dates the intensification of the assimilation policies to right after the founding of the constitutional monarchy in 1932, before Phibunsongkhram came to power (Apornsuvan 2008, pp. 92–93). He states that the new regime consolidated and unified the Thai nation state “based upon the Central Thai imagination”. This regime “turned to a policy of cultural assimilation to stabilize its power and control over the politically active and culturally self-conscious north-eastern and southern regions of the country” (ibid., p. 93). The provincial administration was reorganized and Thai officials took over the positions of local Malay rulers in the South. By not attributing the harsher periods of assimilation solely to Phibunsongkhram, Thanet creates a sense of historical continuity. Many of the more insensitive measures aimed at assimilating the Malay Muslims have been abandoned over the years, as the Thai Government realized that they were counterproductive. However, in everyday life there are still instances in which there is no recognition of the Malay Muslim [35.153.170.189] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 07:39 GMT) Malay Muslims and the Thai-Buddhist State 273 identity. This is, for example, the case when civil servants and locally elected officials who are Malay Muslim have to participate in state rituals. Official Thai ceremonies have strong Buddhist overtones and this puts Muslims who have to interact with or are part of official Thai institutions in a position of conflicting loyalties. Those who object to explicit Buddhist elements of such ceremonies are easily portrayed as disloyal to the Thai state or even to the King. In many official ceremonies, like the Queen’s birthday, attendants have to stand in front of a picture of the King and pay respect to it by clasping their hands...