ASEAN-Russia: Foundations and Future Prospects

The Enlargement of the East Asia Summit: The Reasons and Implications of Bringing Russia In

70 THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EAST ASIA SUMMIT: THE REASONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF BRINGING RUSSIA IN Victor Sumsky INTRODUCTION During the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Summits in Hanoi in October 2010, the Russian Federation was officially invited to accede to the East Asia Summit (EAS). A similar invitation was extended then and there to the United States. Addressing the EAS leaders on that occasion, both the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointed to the readiness of their nations to contribute to the strengthening of this forum as a vehicle for promotion of the regional strategic dialog and security cooperation.1 The EAS is a fairly new phenomenon. Seven years ago, its first session in Kuala Lumpur brought together the heads of states and governments of the ten ASEAN members, along with their colleagues from China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand — the combination of participants often referred to as ASEAN+6. As regards the U.S., way back in 2005, it did not claim a place at the discussion table. More than that, Washington actually made it known that it was not supportive of the idea to convene the EAS. By contrast, Russia not only indicated its interest in becoming a member, but The Enlargement of the East Asia Summit 71 fulfilled a major precondition of membership by signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. This document, also known as the Bali Treaty of 1976, had always been, and remains in the eyes of ASEAN, the most important legal regulator of regional behaviour. Nevertheless, Moscow’s official application was politely declined. To explain this, it was said that Russia’s relations with ASEAN nations (who enjoy the privilege of determining the EAS agenda and accepting new members) were not quite “substantive”. Basically, it implied that Russia-ASEAN trade was too small, compared to that between ASEAN and its key trading partners such as China, Japan and the United States. Since the launching of EAS was presented to the world as a measure to speed up regional economic integration and the birth of East Asian Community, saying “no” to Russia seemed justified — at least, to some extent. Now that the invitation has been finally issued, one may ask what has actually changed. Are Russia’s trade and economic relations with ASEAN more “substantive” today than in the middle of the last decade? According to some optimistic estimates, in 2010, Russia’s total trade turnover with these partners was more than twice as big as in 2005: from about US$5 billion this indicator has gone up to US$12.5 billion. It looks like real progress, doesn’t it? Yes, of course — until one starts comparing these numbers to the trade statistics of the really big players. From that point of view, Russia’s presence in Southeast Asia is still not too meaningful, to put it mildly. Why then was Russia invited to join EAS? As far as I know, this deceptively simple question has never been posed in the media. One possible explanation is that the answer really does not lie on the surface, and anyone who is looking for it will have to dig a bit deeper than usual. In any case, it is fair to assume that EAS membership is not given easily. Free lunches are not the norm of international relations, and Russia in particular has not been famous as a recipient of such gifts in any period of its history. If just a few years ago its application was turned down and now it has been approved, there has to be a serious reason behind that — or even a whole set of reasons. Maybe, back then the assessment of Russia-ASEAN relations as not “substantive” was more of a plausible pretext than a real explanation for Russia’s non-admittance? Some people saw it exactly that way. Apart from that, perceptions of Russia as an external partner may be changing with the shifts in the regional and global environment. And, just because of these same shifts, today’s ideas about the EAS role and objectives may not be quite what they were a while ago. Let us explore these topics one by one. 72 Victor Sumsky MAKING IT WITH AMERICA OR WITHOUT IT? The “long march” towards the EAS was starting when the Cold War was ending. At...