By Design or Accident: Reflections on Asian Security

3. East Asian Security Means Dialogue and US Will

3 East Asian Security Means Dialogue and US Will Rapid growth is transforming the economic landscape of East Asia. Together with changes set in motion by the end of the Cold War, it will transform the strategic landscape as well, creating a need for new structures to maintain stability and defuse tensions. The security problems today in EastAsia pale compared with those faced by the region in the past. The area is more or less at peace for the first time since the end of World War II. But dangers lurk behind the great promise of East Asia and need wise management. The dangers are not imminent. They lie just over the horizon. They arise from the shifting balance between the four major powers — the United States, Japan, China and Russia — whose interests intersect in East Asia. Will this equilibrium alter gradually over the next decades, or will there be precipitate changes? Historical suspicions and rivalries betweenAsian nations were held in abeyance by the contest between the two super powers during the Cold War. They can quickly come to the fore again if there are sudden lurches in the regional power balance. The future of the US security presence and commitments will be the key. East Asian Security 11 If America is seen to be reducing its military forces too fast or losing its will to be a major player, it is likely that there will be new arms races and tensions between the main Asian powers, and new pressures on the smaller countries in the region. China aspires to a large role in Asia as it rapidly gains economic power and upgrades its armed forces. The Japanese government watches this with unease that can turn into alarm and lead to rearmament if it loses confidence in the will or ability of the United States to protect Japan. The joker in the pack, a North Korean nuclear bomb, can also push Japan toward an independent defense policy that would alarm other Asians. A sudden shift in the power balance would also increase the risk of conflict at potential flash points. What can be done to reduce the risks? First, there is a clear need for more multilateral political and security discussions to build trust and cooperation. Second, the main potential cause of destabilizing change, a US military withdrawal that is too fast, must be avoided. New arrangements and institutions are needed, such as the security forum approved by the foreign ministers of seventeen Asia-Pacific nations at an informal dinner discussion in Singapore this past Sunday. The forum has been set up to nurture habits of consultation and cooperation among states in the region, including the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Apart fromASEAN, there has been a lack of multilateral forums in the Asia-Pacific area for political and security discussions. Because of the region’s history, size and diversity, there has been no equivalent of institutions in Europe like NATO, the Western European Union or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Western 12 By Design or Accident Pacific security has been based on an American military presence and a network of bilateral defense treaties and security cooperation arrangements with the United States. Many in the region feel that this structure can no longer by itself deal satisfactorily with the problems of post-Cold War East Asia, where, except on the Korean Peninsula, there are now no clearly defined adversarial relationships. The new dialogue arrangement approved in Singapore on Sunday, which is to be called the ASEAN Regional Forum, could provide a mechanism not just for discussing problems but also for managing potential and actual crises. It can help to accommodate the rising power of China and Japan while integrating Russia and eventually a reunited Korea in the Asia-Pacific security order. But new arrangements for cooperation and confidencebuilding can be successfully put in place only if America remains engaged militarily and economically. They can complement the existing security structure based on the US alliance systems, but they cannot be a substitute. It would be nice to regard balance of power as an old-fashioned concept and expect security anxieties to be alleviated by verbal pledges and paper agreements. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and probably will not be until there is effective international machinery to enforce agreements. US trade with Asia is now 40 per cent greater than US trade with Western...