The ASEAN Regional Forum

7. Assessing the ARF

126 The ASEAN Regional Forum 7 ASSESSING THE ARF The ASEAN Regional Forum was founded as a venue and mechanism for ministerial-level consultation and dialogue among states in East Asia and others with interests in it on political and security issues in the Asia-Pacific. The only region-wide security forum for the Asia-Pacific, the ARF was established in the early 1990s in the light of and in response to the new regional security environment that had developed at the time. This new environment had emerged from the end of the Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the removal of United States forces from their bases in the Philippines, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cam Ranh Bay, the opening up of China and the accompanying surge in China’s economy, military power and political influence, and Japan’s policy foray into regional security multilateralism from an almost total dependence on the Japan-United States security treaty. Vietnamese forces had pulled out of Cambodia, the Cambodian conflict had been politically settled, and the Southeast Asian divide had been narrowed. At the same time, certain “flashpoints” remained in the region. This was an environment in which stability required not only traditional alliance-building and balance-of-power manœuvers but also regional multilateral processes to supplement, if not supplant or transcend, them. The ARF is neither a military alliance nor a defence pact. It has no adversary, actual or potential, against which to devise military plans, conduct military exercises, or direct weapon systems. Indeed, all possible adversaries in the Asia-Pacific are inside the ARF fold; that is the whole point of the forum. However, the principal reality and consideration from which the ARF proceeds 126 Assessing the ARF 127 is the fact that the strategic interests of the major participants differ and diverge, differences that produce misunderstandings and mutual suspicions, if not political, diplomatic or military collisions. The ARF’s main objectives are to reduce the chances of these differences, misunderstandings and suspicions leading to conflict and to ensure that inter-state relations all around, especially among the major participants, progress towards a certain degree of stability. A related goal is to expand the area where their interests converge and cooperation becomes possible. For this purpose, ASEAN, Japan and the so-called “middle powers”, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, succeeded in roping both China and the United States into the forum — to engage China in the regional security process and keep the United States engaged in it. After an initial reluctance on the part of both, China and the United States have come to use the forum on behalf of their respective interests, having seen participation in it as serving those interests. The ARF’s inclusiveness is both its virtue and its weakness. As the only Asia-Pacific forum on regional security, it includes China, the United States and states leaning to one or the other or standing between them. It is meant to promote mutual confidence and cooperation among such disparate powers and thus, presumably, diminish the chances of conflict. On the other hand, the divergent, if not clashing, interests of rival major powers within the ARF prevent the forum from moving forward in terms of “concrete results” as fast as some may want or expect. Yet, the conclusion is inevitable: it is better to have the ARF, slow and ineffectual though it may often seem to be, than not to have it at all. The national interest also plays a critical role in the ARF’s expansion. Despite repeated moratoriums on additional membership and attempts at establishing objective criteria for admission, participation in the ARF swelled from the original eighteen to twenty-seven in 2008. Cambodia, Myanmar, India, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were admitted since the ARF’s inaugural meeting in 1994. Although the merit of the participation of Cambodia, Myanmar, India and North Korea is generally acknowledged, that of the others is more debatable. Decisions on the admission of additional participants have been driven in most cases not by regional considerations in terms of the forum’s efficacy but by the current ARF participants’ relations with the states aspiring for admission. The Concept Paper that ASEAN produced and the ARF ministers adopted at their second meeting in 1995 projected three stages in the forum’s evolution 128 The ASEAN Regional Forum — promotion of confidence...