Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy

Postscript: “Muslim Nation” Dogma and Pancasila Holdovers

Postscript “Muslim Nation” Dogma and Pancasila Holdovers I n the years after 2003–04, Indonesian political parties beefed up their Islamic credentials, whilst simultaneously aiming to hold on to the pluralist message of Pancasila. For the overall shift towards a greater Islamic profile, it was not necessary for Islamists to increase their share of political power significantly. In the 2004 polls, Islamist parties continued to perform relatively poor. As in 1999, they were outperformed by the nationalist-secular camp. A majority of Indonesian politicians continue to believe that a comprehensive Islamist agenda will be unable to get significant electoral support. Above all, they still hold the notion of an Islamic state to be “inopportune” in multireligious Indonesia. Several surveys over recent years have suggested ongoing high approval rates for Pancasila as the 331 332 Islamism in Indonesia best state ideology for Indonesia. Accordingly, a majority of Indonesian Muslims have continued to vote for non-Islamist parties and Islamist parties have once again taken a backseat in the 2009 elections. At the same time, a sizeable section of pious Muslims continue to vote for parties which, while championing a number of pro-umat issues, do not defend an Islamist platform. Yet other polls have at the same time suggested equally high approval rates for shari’ah. They have also indicated that many Indonesians see secularism, “immorality” and the country’s woes, for example corruption, as being intrinsically interlinked. To cater to these beliefs and to cozy up with what they see as Muslim majority electorates, Golkar, the Democrat Party, and even PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party—Struggle), have taken on a greater Islamic identity in recent years. It is helpful to recollect that, from the 1930s to the 1950s, there were clear ideological divisions and often schisms between the secular and the Islamist side of Indonesian politics. These divisions were obscured during Soekarno’s Guided Democracy (1959–65) and Soeharto’s New Order (1966-98). Democracy could have brought these divisions back to the forefront. However, as I highlighted throughout the text, divisions were kept muted because in 1998 and in the following years all parties concentrated on pursuing major policy issues of the reformasi movement that helped to end the New Order. Nevertheless, during the constitutional amendments (1999–2002) Islamist parties — through various strategies and approaches — endeavored to Islamize politics and government and to implement shari’ah at the national level. The 2002 Annual Session of the MPR brought these prospects to a halt, after the same effort had failed in 1945 and 1959. TOWARDS A PRO-ISLAMIC IDEOLOGICAL CENTRE In the years following the constitutional amendments, party politics increasingly moved towards a pro-Islamic ideological centre. This shift basically affected the whole party scene. Parties that were previously seen as “secular nationalist” could no longer be labelled as fully secular. The main parties belonging to this group — the Golkar Party, the Democrat Party and, though to a lesser degree, PDI-P — have increasingly stepped up their efforts to be seen as committed to religious issues. In a Muslim majority country this necessarily means displaying commitment to a variety of umat interests.1 These parties still want to be seen as religiously Postscript: “Muslim Nation” Dogma and Pancasila Holdovers 333 tolerant, but not as defending a secular political agenda. Put differently, they want to be seen as pro-Islam whilst maintaining Pancasila’s claim to defend religious pluralism and tolerance.2 The “Islamic turn” of Golkar, Partai Demokrat, and PDIP, is grounded in the current “Islamization” of significant sections of Indonesian Muslims. “Islamization” means that a greater number of Indonesian Muslims now seem devoted to the observance of basic Islamic rules (such as praying and fasting) and an Islamic appearance in attire and clothing. While this can be understood as a move towards a more conservative understanding of Islam, these Muslims don’t necessarily wish for a comprehensive enforcement of shari’ah and they don’t necessarily vote for an Islamist party at national elections. This notwithstanding, the “Muslim nation” dogma has received further momentum as all political parties can no longer afford to be seen as neutral towards Islamic interests. These parties, however, have less cause for concern if they are seen as being indifferent towards the interests of other faiths or seculars. The political mainstream, at the same time, continues to lack extreme ideological agendas. In fact, while previously “secular” parties have become more pro-Islam...