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17. Implications of the Growing Prevalence of Interregional Crime for Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Chapter
- Additional Information
17 ImPLICATIons of ThE GRowInG PREVALEnCE of InTERREGIonAL CRImE foR CooPERATIon In ThE AsIA-PACIfIC REGIon Sandy Gordon The regions within which criminals interact can be likened to Barry Buzan’s concept of a “security complex”. By a “security complex”, Buzan had in mind a region in which the internal “amity-enmity” lines are more powerful than the external “amity-enmity” lines.1 In the case of criminal activity, the equivalent to a security complex would be a group of countries within which criminal “transactions” are more intense than they are with countries outside that group. In this chapter we refer to such groupings as “crime regions”. Similarly, we refer to “crime locations” as specific countries in which criminality, including transnational crime, has taken root because of poor governance, and from which criminal attacks on outside countries can be mounted at minimal risk to the criminal. The thesis of this chapter is that certain closely related structural changes to the international order and transnational crime have progressively facilitated the breaking down of “crime regions” and increased propensity of “crime locations” to have an impact outside their own “crime regions”. As a consequence, we have also witnessed in recent years the increasing propensity for criminal activity to take on inter, as well as an intra, regional dimensions. This development has important implications for international cooperation 293 294 Sandy Gordon against transnational crime. The three regions we discuss are South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia (including the Southwest Pacific). GLobALIzATIon And sTRuCTuRAL ChAnGEs To TRAnsnATIonAL CRImInAL GRouPs It is now often argued that criminal groups capable of acting successfully across international borders have certain characteristics. They consist of individuals or small, “nimble” groups forming temporary alliances for specific criminal purposes. Such networks often operate across some of the ethnic demarcation lines that traditionally characterized secret criminal activity. Members of these modern groups are frequently well connected into political and official circles. They depend on networked transactions. They also operate in so-called “grey markets”, which bridge legitimate business activity and criminality. This type of criminal interaction has become known in some circles as “transactional” organized crime.2 Unlike hierarchical organizations, which can be “taken out” from the top down, such networks are difficult for law enforcement to dismantle in their entirety, being largely self-replicating in ways designed to meet market need and avoid law enforcement intervention. Because they do not necessarily carry their expertise “in house”, such groups have become increasingly reliant on “facilitators” who have skills in the laundering of money, movement of illicit goods and people, and as agents of corruption to oil the wheels of criminality. For example, in late 1998 the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Customs Service (ACS) interdicted Australia’s largest ever heroin importation (Operation Linnet). The structure of the organization behind this importation of 390 kilograms of heroin involved separate financiers and organizers, a transporter to take the drugs to a port in Myanmar, a transporter to bring the heroin from Mynamar to Australia, a “cutoff ” team sent to Australia to take delivery of the bulk drugs, and four separate wholesalers of the heroin in Australia. Had the shipment not been interdicted, the criminal network would doubtless have utilized the services of professional money launderers to repatriate the funds to the location of the organizers (Hong Kong) or another location of convenience. None of these “facilitators” appears to have been part of the organizing syndicate. Rather, they acted as sub-contractors.3 Given that both transnational crime and terrorism are highly secretive activities, it may well be asked how these loose, networked transactions work. How could such groups and facilitators, especially where cross-community [18.232.188.122] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 11:11 GMT) Implications of Growing Interregional Crime for Asia-Pacific Cooperation 295 activity is involved, get together for one-off activities when they do not operate in the open contractual markets characteristic of legitimate business? One answer might lie in the existence of what we refer to as “crime hubs”. These are locations of convenience where criminals from different regions and groups rub shoulders, develop networks, and plan activities. Certain locations, such as Bangkok and Brussels in the case of document fraud, and the Mumbai-Karachi-Dubai triangle in the case of money laundering, are noted for certain services. Hong Kong was also an important location of convenience, but has in recent years become a more difficult venue for criminals to plan activities. Some Hong Kong criminals, such...