Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?: Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)

16. BARE-CHESTED POLITICS IN CENTRAL SULAWESI: The Dynamics of Local Elections in a Post-conflict Region

352 352 Graham Brown and Rachel Diprose 16 BARE-CHESTED POLITICS IN CENTRAL SULAWESI The Dynamics of Local Elections in a Post-conflict Region Graham Brown and Rachael Diprose INTRODUCTION The 2005 pilkada (pilihan kepala daerah, or local head election) for the positions of bupati (regent) and wakil bupati (deputy regent) in the troubled Indonesian district of Poso were of vital importance for the future stability of the region and the reconciliation processes under way. Given the instrumental role of political and electoral mobilization as one of the features underpinning violence in the post-Soeharto period, there were many fears that the elections could see a return to violence. From a social scientific perspective, the elections were also important as they allow us a snapshot of the status and dynamics of the broad peace that has endured since 2001 despite many incidences of provocation. Using a two-level conceptualization of peace at the elite and the grassroots level, this paper examines how far the pilkada elections are indicative of a move towards a more “positive” peace at the elite and grass-roots level. Examining various formal and informal interventions in the campaigning for the election, we argue that at the elite level, a strong negative peace is in place to prevent a return to conflict, but with little positive engagement to address some of the underlying problems or construct a mutual vision for the future 352 16 DeepeningDemocracy Ch 16 1/15/09, 11:23 AM 352 353 Bare-Chested Politics in Central Sulawesi 353 for all groups involved. At the grass-roots level, we argue that voting patterns suggest a similar lack of positive peace at this level and an even weaker form of negative peace. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Cross-country evidence has shown that democracies are less likely to experience civil war than authoritarian states (Hegre et al. 2001). While democracies may be more likely to channel conflict in peaceful ways, democratizing countries — those in transition, such as Indonesia — are more prone to conflict, and social tensions in these nations are more likely to escalate into violence (Gurr 2000; Gurr 2001; Snyder 2000). In addition, Tilly (2003) argues that regime types themselves will affect the character and nature of collective violence, which is evident in the discussion of the New Order regime below. Given the increased likelihood of violent conflict in states in transition, this research focuses on the period in Indonesia where “transition” is at the fore of contemporary popular discourse, using the case of Poso in Central Sulawesi. That is not to say that transition is the root cause of violence in democratizing countries, but rather that it may create a space for pre-existing grievances to surface. In times of political, social, and economic transition as experienced by Indonesia since 1998, the very processes and products of change and “development”, and the consequent injection or withdrawal of resources in communities, can challenge value systems, decision-making responsibilities, power relations, and patron–client relations. In turn, there is a greater likelihood of an intensification of the means, motives, and opportunities for local conflict (Barron et al. 2004; Bates 2000). However, violent local conflict does not always result, which is evident in the analysis below of the dynamics of the Poso pilkada. Brass (1997), Diprose (2004), Tadjoeddin (2002), Varshney et al. (2004), and Wilkinson (2004), amongst others, identify the localized nature of violence and local dynamics as key factors explaining why violent conflicts occur in some regions and not others. Wilkinson (2004), for example, highlights local level electoral incentives for political elites to mobilize in seeking to explain violent outcomes in India, an important consideration in our understanding of the pilkada dynamics in Poso. Mustapha (2000) also identifies the role of elites in mobilizing for violence in nations such as Nigeria. Yet Wilkinson makes the important point that most studies which identify instrumentalist elite mobilization strategies as explanations of violent outcomes only focus on national actors, which does not explain why violence 16 DeepeningDemocracy Ch 16 1/15/09, 11:23 AM 353 354 354 Graham Brown and Rachel Diprose occurs in some regions and not others at the local level. That is the focus of this study — why did the pilkada in Poso not result in violence? In examining the elections within the post-conflict context, we propose a modified version of the “positive peace–negative peace” framework developed by Johan Galtung (1969, 1975). Galtung...