Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?: Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)

6. PILKADA, MONEY POLITICS AND THE DANGERS OF “INFORMAL GOVERNANCE” PRACTICES

125 Pilkada, Money Politics and the Dangers of “Informal Governance” Practices 125 6 PILKADA, MONEY POLITICS AND THE DANGERS OF “INFORMAL GOVERNANCE” PRACTICES Syarif Hidayat INTRODUCTION Since mid-2002 (approximately one year after the implementation of Law No. 22/1999), discussions on decentralization and regional autonomy policies in Indonesia began to focus on the realities of so-called otonomi kebablasan (over-exaggerated autonomy) vs. otonomi setengah hati (halfhearted autonomy).1 Polemics on this issue started to penetrate upwards in early 2003, due to the agreement of various involved parties on the necessity to revise Law No. 22/1999, agreed to be the most effective remedy to end the practices of over-exaggerated and half-hearted regional autonomy. By 2004 the debate on the urgency of revising Law No. 22 faded somewhat from public discourse because of the interest stirred by the direct presidential election. Then, in October 2004, after the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla as president and vice president, the government together with the DPR (National Assembly) decreed Law No. 32/2004 to replace Law No. 22/1999.2 Substantially, one of the important changes instigated by Law No. 32/2004 is the implementation of the so-called sistem pilkada langsung (a direct election system for local government heads). In following up the performance of this constitutional mandate, the central government decided to carry out the direct elections immediately, starting in mid-2005. This 125 06 DeepeningDemocracy Ch 6 1/15/09, 11:17 AM 125 126 126 Syarif Hidayat decision has been valued by many observers as a “big step”, and a fundamental reform, towards a more democratic local government in Indonesia. However, it is also possible to conceive of a number of factors which could, directly or indirectly, threaten the attainment of that expectation. Amongst other things are the dangers of so-called “money politics” (during the pilkada process), and “informal governance” practices in the post-pilkada period. Theoretically, it has been contended that the implementation of a direct election system for local government heads would bring a number of promises to the establishment of a democratic local government, or what many scholars have currently labelled as “local good governance” (Arghiros 2001; Smith 1985). Decentralization policy, it is believed, pushes the central government to disperse its power and authority to local governments. Meanwhile, directly electing local government heads allows the attainment of an accountable local government, as a corollary, thus leading local governments to be more responsive to the demands of their communities. Thus, together decentralization and a direct election system have been seen as a way of reducing the power and size of swollen central state bureaucracies, and of improving accountability for development planning and spending at a more local level. However, I would argue that theoretical arguments regarding the value of a direct election system above (including the pilkada) become meaningful only when the direct election system is analysed from a “substantive democracy” perspective, that is when so-called “democratic behaviour” exists both within the realm of local state actors and within society at the regional level (Ostrom 1991; Oyugi 2000). “Democratic behaviour” means that the majority of voters (society) qualitatively possess enough knowledge of politics that they will make sure that their vote is given to the right candidate, and their decision to vote is based on rational political considerations. I suggest that this “substantive democracy assumption” is less relevant as a conceptual framework for understanding Indonesia’s pilkada since there is a relatively low standard, or even the absence, of democratic behaviour both in the realm of state actors and within society in general. The question then is what are the possible dangers of executing a direct pilkada system when “democratic behaviour” is relatively absent in reality? This paper attempts to answer this question, beginning with briefly casting light on the rationality of implementing a direct pilkada system, then proceeding to illuminate its implication towards money politics practices, as well as the dangers of informal governance practices in the post-pilkada period. 06 DeepeningDemocracy Ch 6 1/15/09, 11:17 AM 126 127 Pilkada, Money Politics and the Dangers of “Informal Governance” Practices 127 DECENTRALIZATION AND THE DIRECT PILKADA SYSTEM: EXPECTATIONS VS. REALITY Conceptually, the urgency of implementing a direct pilkada is closely related to the efforts to realize the basic goals of decentralization, namely the creation of a democratic local government and the enhancement of society...